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 In recent months, a plethora of states have turned their legislative 
attention to protecting employee privacy in the workplace, focusing 
specifically on passing state laws that protect the “social media privacy” of 
individuals in their states.  Indeed, discussions of workplace privacy are 
everywhere nowadays:  Media stories condemn employers’ efforts to 
monitor their employees’ email, Internet, and telephone usage.  Employees 
rage about perceived invasions of their privacy.  Politicians heatedly debate 
how to limit employers’ prying conduct, passing laws designed to reign in 
certain types of monitoring by employers.  At the same time, employers 
also find themselves perplexed as they grapple with how they can gather 
the information that they need to make important business decisions within 
an environment that views such efforts with disdain.  In a world where 
technological advancements have made it easier than ever to collect 
massive amounts of information about those in the workforce and where 
employers feel an increasing need to collect such information, looming 
questions remain regarding the proper scope and limits of employees’ 
privacy. 
This Article represents one effort to answer these questions while 
taking the employers’ perspective into account, explaining both the 
motivations behind and justifications for employers’ efforts to “snoop” into 
their employees’ private lives.  The Article describes the means through 
which employers gather information about their employees, including 
through some recent, rather novel approaches to collecting such data.  In 
addition, this Article discusses the financial, legal, and practical concerns 
that motivate employers to snoop in the first place, arguing that employers 
engage in this conduct for what frequently amount to very legitimate 
reasons.  More significantly, this article places substantial responsibility for 
employer snooping with the courts themselves, highlighting particular 
decisions and doctrines that not only permit, but in fact encourage, 
employers to engage in these efforts to monitor employees. 
At bottom, this paper attempts to put the “problem” of employer 
snooping into a broader context.  While employers certainly should not 
have access to every aspect of their prospective and current employees’ 
private lives, and while abuses of the boundaries undoubtedly exist, much 
of the snooping behavior for which employers have been condemned 
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represents more than just senseless meddling, but rather is part of a sound 
business plan designed to protect employers, employees, and the public at 
large. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2013, three members of Congress introduced legislation 
aimed at barring employers from requiring or requesting that any employee 
or prospective employee provide an employer with a username, password, 
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SNOOPING EMPLOYERS 553 
 
or other means of accessing a private email or social media account.
1
  This 
federal law, coming on the heels of similar legislation passed in at least ten 
states
2
 and pending in many others,
3
 has been characterized as “vital to 
preventing employer requests for personal accounts becoming routine.”
4
  In 
the same vein, employees in recent years increasingly have complained 
about other types of alleged intrusions by employers – intrusions involving 
everything from the monitoring of telephone and email communications, to 
the use of global position systems (GPS) to track employees’ whereabouts, 
to the application of sophisticated technology that can record virtually 
every keystroke made by an employee on his/her employer-owned 
computer.
5
 
At first blush, the outrage expressed by both workers and the public 
regarding this type of employer conduct seems understandable, even 
predictable:  What possible reason might an employer have for needing to 
delve into an employee’s social media account?  Why must an employer 
know the precise location of an employee at every moment of the 
workday?  Should there not be some areas of an employee’s life that can 
remain “private,” safe from employer intrusion, even if such areas touch 
upon workplace activities?  Given that employers’ efforts to monitor 
employees show no signs of abating, and given that the technological 
means for engaging in such monitoring are only becoming more 
 
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001; 
B.A., University of Michigan, 1997. I am grateful to Professor Orly Lobel and the students 
in her Work, Welfare and Justice Seminar at the University of San Diego School of Law for 
their helpful suggestions with respect to this paper.  Finally, many thanks to Camille 
Gustufson for her excellent research assistance. 
 1.  Social Networking Online Protection Act (“SNOPA”), H.R. 537, 113th Cong. 
(2013).  See also Michael O. Loatman, Congress May Limit Employer Access To Personal 
Social Media Accounts, DAILY LAB. REP., Feb. 11, 2013 (describing the implications of the 
new legislation).  This actually was the second time that members of Congress had 
attempted to pass legislation of this nature.  Previous bills, similarly aimed at limiting 
employers’ access to prospective and current employees’ email and social media account 
credentials, were introduced in both the House and the Senate in spring 2012 but failed to 
garner sufficient support to become law.  See id.; see also Lance Whitney, Democrats to 
employers: Stop asking for Facebook passwords, CNET, (May 10, 2012), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57431724-83/democrats-to-employers-stop-asking-for-
facebook-passwords/ (describing a bill that seeks to stop employers from asking employees 
for their personal passwords to online accounts). 
 2.  See infra note 93. 
 3.  See Jean Eaglesham & Michael Rothfeld, Wall Street vs. Its Employees’ Privacy, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323551004578436713224083592.html 
(highlighting states’ efforts to adopt social-media privacy laws). 
 4.  See Loatman, supra note 1. 
 5.  See Robert Sprague, Orwell was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the 
United States and its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 84 
(2008) (critiquing the lack of employee privacy). 
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sophisticated every day, the answers to questions like these will grow to be 
increasingly more pressing in the months and years to come. 
This Article attempts to provide one response to this important set of 
questions, explaining both the motivations and justifications for this type of 
“snooping” behavior by employers.  The Article not only describes the 
mechanisms typically adopted by employers to gather information about 
prospective and current employees, but also argues that such intrusions by 
employers in many cases are reasonable – and indeed, even prudent.  This 
Article will begin in Part I by providing some history and context to the 
issue of employee workplace privacy, reviewing some of the relevant rights 
and responsibilities of employers with respect to employee privacy.  
Among other things, the Article will describe the very limited privacy 
rights that are available to employees, particularly for those who work in 
the private sector.  In Part II, this Article will discuss the methods used by 
employers to gather information about employees, and will describe how 
various restrictions on conventional methods of information gathering have 
led to the evolution of more unusual – and arguably more intrusive – means 
of monitoring employees.  While this section will generally describe a host 
of tools currently used by employers to gather information about 
prospective and current employees, it will pay particular attention to the 
recent flurry of attention surrounding employer requests for individuals’ 
social media passwords.  In Part III, this Article will explain why 
employers are more motivated than ever to engage in snooping behavior, 
laying out the financial, legal, and practical concerns that render it logical – 
and even advisable – for employers to snoop.  In Part IV, this argument 
extends one step further, with a discussion of the role that the courts 
(including the U.S. Supreme Court) have played in permitting, and even 
encouraging, employers’ efforts to monitor employees.  Finally, in Part V, 
the Article will propose some limits on employers’ right to snoop, 
articulating some responsibilities that employers should have when 
engaging in any monitoring of prospective or current employees. 
At bottom, this Article sets out to put the alleged “problem” of 
employer snooping in a more informed context and to show that it is not 
the dilemma that many represent it to be – at least, not one that requires the 
heightened level of legislative attention and media hype that has emerged 
in recent months and years.  While abuses of employee privacy 
unquestionably exist, employers by and large are not encroaching 
unreasonably into their employees’ private lives.  Employers gather 
information about prospective and current employees not out of some 
prurient desire to delve into the personal and private aspects of their lives, 
but rather out of an informed, careful, and logical consideration of the risks 
associated with not acquiring such information.  While advances in 
technology have expanded employers’ ability to snoop, employers’ actions 
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in large part have been tailored to their legitimate needs. 
I. THE LIMITED RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN A PRIVATE 
SECTOR WORKPLACE
6
 
 Any discussion of workplace privacy should begin with an 
understanding of one key idea:  Employees in the modern American 
workplace possess extremely limited privacy rights.
7
  Regardless of the 
specific workplace setting, employers generally possess broad latitude to 
scrutinize the background of potential employees and to monitor details of 
current employees’ behavior.
8
  Employers may launch thorough 
investigations into the qualifications of a job applicant, using a host of 
psychological and other tests; they may conduct extensive background 
checks on a potential employee; they may run Internet searches to learn as 
much as possible about a potential new hire.
9
  With respect to current 
 
 6.  While this article focuses on employer snooping within the private sector, many of 
the ideas discussed herein would apply with equal force to public sector employees.  Public 
sector employees possess somewhat greater privacy rights than their private sector 
counterparts due to application of constitutional protections to their employers’ conduct.  
See Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 
906 (2012) (noting that private sector employees generally cannot rely upon constitutional 
rights to being a privacy claim, but rather must turn to a common law privacy tort).  
However, the privacy rights of even public sector employees still are fairly limited in scope. 
See generally Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
277 (2012) (discussing how a heightened sense of privacy for public sector employees has 
become less certain in light of recent case law, including City of Ontario v. Quon); cf. Sheila 
A. Bentzen, Safe for Work?  Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Standard of Privacy for 
Government Employees in Light of City of Ontario v. Quon, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1283, 1286 n.5 
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that “[p]ublic employees’ privacy interests 
are not necessarily different from those of private employees, but the public employment 
relationship is governed by certain bodies of law, most notably the Constitution, that do not 
apply to the private sector”). 
 7.  See Sprague, supra note 5, at 84 (stating that “[e]mployees have virtually no 
privacy”); see also id. at 89 (citing the “near extinction” of privacy rights for employees); 
see e.g. Lindsay Noyce, Private Ordering of Employee Privacy: Protecting Employees’ 
Expectations of Privacy with Implied-in-Fact Contract Rights, 1 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L. F. 
27, 27 (2011) (noting that “[e]mployees, perhaps irrationally, often overestimate the amount 
of privacy they should expect in technological communication”).   
 8.  See Sprague, supra note 5, at 84 (“The employer has the potential to be Big 
Brother, always watching, listening, and recording.”); see also Boris Segalis, Employee 
Privacy Gains in the United States, INFO. LAW GRP. (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.infolawgroup.com/2011/01/articles/enforcement/employee-privacy-gains-in-the-
united-states/ (noting that “[t]raditionally, in the U.S., employees have enjoyed little privacy 
in the workplace. With respect to workplace communications, for example, employees 
generally are deemed not to have ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy.’ With some 
limitations, this allows employers to freely monitor and review employee 
communications”). 
 9.  See Sprague, supra note 5, at 84 (enumerating the monitoring and screening tools 
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employees, employers examine everything from employees’ Internet, 
telephone, and email usage, to the keystrokes that they enter into their 
computers, to the coworkers with whom they socialize, to the number and 
length of the bathroom breaks that they take throughout the day.
10
 As one 
commentator in this area has observed:  “What is allowed to be monitored 
and what can be done with the monitoring . . . ?  The answer seems to be 
that an employer can monitor virtually anything, and almost anything can 
be done with it.”
11
 
While employers do enjoy relative freedom to snoop into the private 
lives of potential and current employees, there is a hodgepodge of federal 
and state laws (and, in some limited cases, constitutional provisions
12
) that 
establish some boundaries for employers in this context.
13
  The primary 
federal law that impacts employee privacy in the workplace is the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),
14
 which consists 
of two parts:  the Wiretap Act (Title I)
15
 and the Stored Communications 
Act (Title II).
16
  The Wiretap Act has a rather limited application to 
 
that are available and used by employers for both applicants and current employees, ranging 
from video and electronic surveillance to internet tracking and keylogging).  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Karin Mika, The Benefit of Adopting Comprehensive Standards of Monitoring 
Employee technology Use in the Workplace, CORNELL HR REV. (Sept. 22, 2012), 
http://www.cornellhrreview.org/the-benefit-of-adopting-comprehensive-standards-of-
monitoring-employee-technology-use-in-the-workplace/. 
 12.  See generally Kim, supra note 6 (citing the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure); Secunda, supra note 6 (noting the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee for public employees); Bentzen, supra note 6 (discussing constitutional provisions 
impacting employees’ right to privacy). 
13. For a more thorough summary of the current state of the law in this area, including the 
privacy protections proposed in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW (Tentative Draft 
No. 6, 2013), see Secunda, supra note 6 (discussing developments in employment privacy 
law, including under the context of a newly drafted Chapter 7 of the RESTATEMENT); see 
also Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century 
Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L. J.  285, 290-301 (2011) (discussing 
the indirect ways in which the legal system provides for employee privacy); Sprague, supra 
note 5, at 93-111 (noting that the “legal right to privacy in the United States” is provided in 
the “common law, constitutional law, and federal statutes.”); Jill L. Rosenberg, Conference 
Presentation, Is Big Brother Watching: Monitoring Employee Communications and 
Employee Privacy, AM. BAR ASS’N LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW CONFERENCE, 409 
(2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2010/annu
alconference/171.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing theories used in privacy rights litigation, 
while providing and suggesting procedures that can be used by employers to minimize 
belief among employees that their privacy rights are being violated according to the laws of 
both federal and selected state jurisdictions); 
 14.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1851, 1859 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511 (2006)). 
 15.  Id. at § 2511(1). 
 16.  Id.at § 2701. 
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concerns regarding employee workplace privacy, since it prohibits only the 
interception of electronic communications while in transmission.
17
  Most 
modern communications only are “in transmission” for a matter of seconds, 
minimizing the opportunities for interception.
18
  The Stored 
Communications Act, however, has a more significant application to 
workplace monitoring, since it prohibits unauthorized access to 
communications while in electronic storage.
19
  Indeed, in enacting the 
Stored Communications Act, Congress’ intent was to provide protection to 
individuals’ emails and text messages
20
 – both of which represent fertile 
areas of employer monitoring.
21
 
Despite these protections, however, the ECPA contains several 
significant exceptions that allow for employer monitoring under certain 
circumstances:  Under the “consent exception,” an employer can engage in 
monitoring if one of the parties to a communication consents to 
monitoring.
22
  Under the “course of business exception,” an employer can 
engage in monitoring that occurs in its normal course of business, such as 
by intercepting phone calls on telephone equipment used in the employer’s 
ordinary course of business.
23
  Under a third exception, the “provider 
exception,” an employer that provides wire or electronic communications 
services can retrieve information stored on its system, if such access is 
necessary to protect its rights as the provider of this electronic service.
24
  
Thus, an employer that provides an email or voicemail system to its 
employees can, under this exception, freely access information from that 
voicemail or email system. 
 
 17.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 291-93 (discussing the applicability of the 
Wiretap Act and noting that the vast majority of modern electronic communications are only 
considered to be “in transmission” for mere seconds prior to arrival at their final 
destinations). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006) (stating that an individual who intentionally 
accesses a “wire or electronic communication while it is still in electronic storage in such a 
system” will be subject to punishment). 
 20.  See Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 438 (observing that “Congress enacted the ECPA 
to make the already existing Federal Wiretap Act . . . applicable to newly emerging 
communication devices”); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 13,, at 291-92 (stating that “[t]he 
ECPA was intended to extend privacy protection from wire communications such as 
telephone calls, to electronic communications such as e-mails and text messages”). 
 21.  See infra note 56. 
 22.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 293 (listing exceptions to the ECPA). 
 23.  See id. (listing exceptions to the ECPA); see also Sprague, supra note 5, at 116-17 
(stating that a business use exception to the Act exists, where employers are allowed to 
monitor calls for “telephone equipment used in the ordinary course of business”).  
 24.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 293 (noting that exceptions exist under multiple 
conditions, including consent, course of business, and “exception for employers that access 
stored information, if such access is necessary to protect its rights or property as the 
provider of the electronic service”). 
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A second federal statute that might impact employer monitoring at 
work is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),
25
 which prohibits 
“knowingly access[ing] a computer without authorization or exceeding 
authorized access.”
26
  The CFAA, however, is not likely to apply to 
employee monitoring in any significant way.  Most courts interpreting this 
statute have held that the scope of an individual’s authorization to access a 
computer network should be analyzed according to “expected norms of 
intended use.”
27
  Because most employers are authorized to access 
computer networks that are their own property, this statute more typically 
applies “when employees or competitors hack into an employer’s system to 
discover confidential information.”
28
 
In addition to these federal statutory protections (as well as legislative 
efforts by some states),
29
 common law “invasion of privacy” principles also 
might provide some protection against employer intrusions.  Employees 
may bring a tort claim alleging an unlawful “intrusion upon seclusion” by 
showing that an employer intruded into “a place or property where [the 
employee possessed] a reasonable expectation of privacy,” and by 
establishing that this intrusion “would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”
30
  Many employees, however, may have difficulty showing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in areas monitored by their employer, 
particularly where monitoring takes place on or within the employer’s 
property.
31
  Indeed, courts will find liability for an intrusion upon seclusion 
 
 25.  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (outlining the circumstances that constitute an 
unauthorized use of a computer and detailing the consequences for an individual who is in 
violation of the CFAA). 
 26.  See id. (defining what constitutes a violation of the CFFA). 
 27.  Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the 
difficult balance that employers must maintain between protecting the interests of their 
company and ensuring the privacy of employees and noting the response of the American 
legal system to this issue, explaining the context and implications for acts such as the 
CFFA).  
 28.  Id.  One additional source of statutory protection for employees can be found in 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) 
(stipulating that employers may not interfere with employees’ right to engage in concerted 
activities).  Some have argued that certain types of surveillance by an employer constitute 
this type of unlawful interference because such conduct might “chill” employees’ exercise 
of their right to engage in concerted activities.  See supra notes 15-16 (prohibiting the 
interception of and access to certain communications). 
 29.  See, e.g., Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 294-98 (describing analogous state 
legislation). 
 30.  See id. at 299 (describing how employees can use common law and “invasion of 
privacy” torts as some protection against employer monitoring); see also Secunda, supra 
note 6, at 294-95 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the elements of intrusion 
upon seclusion).   
 31.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 300 (describing how the court may have applied 
the RESTATEMENT to the Trotti case.). 
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tort only where an employer invades very private locations, such as 
employee locker rooms or restrooms.
32
  Accordingly, the common law – 
like its statutory counterparts – remains of minimal use to employees 
seeking protection from employer prying.
33
 
 
II. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL HURDLES AFFECTING 
EMPLOYERS’ ABILITY TO SNOOP 
 As noted above, the “right to privacy” at work exists as a rather 
illusory right, particularly for private sector workers.  Employers possess 
significant latitude when it comes to gathering information about both 
prospective and current workers.  This freedom to snoop, however, is not 
without any limits:  While employers, in theory, possess an unfettered right 
to poke around in their employees’ private lives, various practical and legal 
obstacles may hinder employers’ ability to use certain methods of gathering 
information. 
A. Limits Associated with Traditional Tools for Information Gathering 
Employers face several restrictions with respect to their ability to 
research the backgrounds of both prospective and current employees, 
including limitations with respect to methods that traditionally have been 
used in the workplace.  For example, while popular media frequently 
depicts the polygraph (i.e., lie detector) test as a common method of testing 
an individual’s veracity, the federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 
1988 effectively bars employers from using a polygraph test to screen 
either job applicants or current employees, except in very limited 
situations.
34
  Similarly, while employers may want information regarding a 
 
 32.  Id. at 301. 
 33.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2013) also proposes 
some privacy protections for private sector workers, including a newly named tort of 
“wrongful employer intrusion upon [a] protected employee privacy interest.”  See Secunda, 
supra note 6, at 295-96 (noting and detailing the changes in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
EMP’T LAW (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2013) recognizing wrongful employer intrusion and 
defining it). 
 34.  See Ian Byrnside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers 
Using Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 
451 (2008) (noting that employers are increasingly monitoring job applicants’ social media 
pages and observing that this leads to a gray area of the law, as employers have previously 
had legal ramifications for using certain methods to investigate an applicant’s criminal 
history or financial status, using the EPPA as an example.); see also Stephen F. Befort, Pre-
Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 365, 401-02 (1997) (noting that more than half of all states have 
enacted statutes similar to the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, many with restrictions 
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potential or current employee’s drug usage or medical status, both federal 
and state laws may limit employers’ ability to conduct medical and/or drug 
testing as part of the hiring process,
35
 as well as with current employees.
36
  
Employers wanting to explore a potential employee’s credit history will 
have to comply with specific requirements under the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act,
37
 and those wishing to check applicants’ criminal records may run 
afoul of federal and/or state antidiscrimination statutes.
38
 
In addition to the above-described tools, employers for many years 
relied on a battery of honesty tests, personality tests, and other 
psychological examinations in screening potential (and sometimes current) 
employees.
39
  These examinations attempt to gauge an individual’s integrity 
and/or assess the individual’s psychological state by measuring traits such 
as the applicant’s potential for violence, propensity for addiction, and 
reaction to figures of authority.
40
  Yet, these tests also create both legal and 
practical challenges for employers.  Certain types of questions on these 
exams may violate federal and/or state antidiscrimination principles, 
particularly where questions inquire into a candidate’s religious beliefs or 
sexual practices.
41
  These tests also have proven to be of questionable 
 
even more stringent than those established by federal law).  
 35.  See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 451-452 (noting the EPPA restriction on polygraph 
tests and the ADA restrictions on medical examinations and drug testing); see also Befort, 
supra note 34, at 392-99 (describing limitations on testing in both the private and public 
sectors). 
 36.  See Rochelle B. Ecker, To Catch a Thief: The Private Employer’s Guide to Getting 
and Keeping an Honest Employee, 63 UMKC L. REV. 251, 272 (1994) (discussing state 
legislation that limits employers’ use of employee drug testing); see also Lisa Guerin, 
Workplace Testing: What Your Employer May Require, NOLO, available at 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/workplace-testing-employer-requirements-
29496.html (delineating the legality of various workplace testing methods). 
 37.  See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 450-51 (comparing the difficulties an employer 
may legally have monitoring an employee’s social media page to the potential legal 
challenges an employer faces when looking into an employee’s financial history.). 
 38.  See id. at 450 (noting that employment decisions based on criminal records must be 
“consistent with ‘business necessity’ and [must] not have a disparate impact on a certain 
class of applicants”). 
 39.  See Susan J. Stabile, The Use of Personality Tests as a Hiring Tool: Is the Benefit 
Worth the Cost?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 279-80 (2002) (exploring the effectiveness 
and privacy issues surrounding use of personality tests as a hiring technique). 
 40.  See Befort, supra note 34, at 402-03 (describing the use of personality tests by 
employers to discover certain characteristics about a potential employee and noting the 
regulations against using a polygraph test on a potential employee); see also Stabile, supra 
note 39, at 283-85 (discussing the factors giving rise to the widespread use of personality 
tests). 
 41.  See Befort, supra note 34, at 402-04 (describing the EPPA restriction on polygraph 
tests for hiring purposes as well as additional state legislation restricting polygraph use); see 
also Stabile, supra note 39, at 286-88 (describing the extent to which the Americans with 
Disabilities Act may limit employers’ ability to administer certain types of personality 
tests); see also Stabile, supra note 39, at 289-98 (describing a variety of flaws in the 
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SNOOPING EMPLOYERS 561 
 
utility and reliability, largely because they “measure intangible qualities 
such as intelligence and ability to be truthful,” thus injecting subjectivity 
into the scoring of the examinations and producing inconsistent and 
untrustworthy results.
42
  Thus, even to the extent that an employer ventures 
to utilize these tools, the information gathered as a result may be of little 
utility. 
Faced with these obstacles in gathering information on their own, yet 
hungry for data about prospective employees in particular, many employers 
have turned to another seemingly reliable source for learning about 
potential new hires:  soliciting reference information from a candidate’s 
former employers.  Yet, here too, employers frequently encounter barriers.  
In theory, employers possess significant latitude to provide reference 
information regarding a former employee, even where the reference will 
include negative information.
43
  In order to encourage employers to share 
an accurate assessment of a former worker’s abilities, the law grants 
employers a “qualified privilege” to communicate information to a 
prospective employer as part of a reference request.
44
  Under this qualified 
privilege, an employer may not be held legally liable for the contents of a 
response to a reference request (i.e., through a defamation suit) so long as 
he or she does not communicate false information about an employee “with 
malice” – a term that different courts will define in different ways.
45
 
Despite this potential protection, however, many employers remain 
wary of providing reference information.  Employers fear the cost of 
having to litigate an expensive defamation suit to prove the existence of the 
qualified privilege if they do provide negative information about a former 
employee.
46
  Moreover, employers worry that providing even positive 
 
accuracy of personality tests to screen applicants).  
 42.  See Ecker, supra note 36, at 260 (noting the issues with using personality tests and 
honesty tests and observing a recent California court ruling that the use of the former was 
difficult to justify); see also Stabile, supra note 39, at 297 (noting that many who have 
studied these tests have expressed “real concern about both the reliability and validity of 
personality tests”); see also Stabile, supra note 39 at 289-98 (describing the faults of 
personality tests).  
 43.  See Stabile, supra note 39, at 283-84 (discussing employers’ capacity to provide 
reference information). 
 44.  See Befort, supra note 34, at 407 (describing the restrictions on a former employer 
when providing information about an employee to a prospective employer). 
 45.  Id. at 408.  While some courts apply a common law standard for malice, requiring 
“a showing of actual ill will or intent to [harm] the plaintiff,” other courts use an “actual 
malice” standard, which “requires a plaintiff to prove that [a] statement was made with 
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of [its truth or falsity].”  See id. at 408 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the standards used to determine if a former 
employer has exceeded its legal boundaries when providing information about an employee 
to a prospective employer). 
 46.  See John Ashby, Employment References: Should Employers Have an Affirmative 
Duty to Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring Prospective Employers?, 46 ARIZ. L. 
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information about a former worker may lead to trouble down the road, 
since employers may face exposure for negligent misrepresentation if an 
employee who received a positive reference subsequently exhibits violence 
or otherwise harms a member of the public.
47
  Accordingly, confronted 
with this difficult decision regarding what information about a former 
employee should be provided to a prospective employer, many employers 
simply refuse to provide any substantive information at all, limiting 
reference information to the employee’s dates of employment, positions 
held, final pay, and certain other objectively-verifiable information.
48
  
Others entirely refuse to respond to reference requests.
49
 
B. The Rise in More Creative Tools for Information Gathering 
Thus, when it comes to using traditional tools for gathering 
information about both prospective and current employees, many 
employers find themselves stymied in their efforts.  At the same time, 
however, employers are under increasing pressure to gather information 
about their workers – both about prospective employees and about those 
who currently are employed.
50
  Accordingly, faced with an increasing 
concern for gathering information and a decreasing ability to use traditional 
methods to do so, many employers have adopted more novel approaches 
for obtaining the data that they need. 
Almost as a matter of course nowadays, employers use the Internet to 
gather information about prospective and current employees, taking 
advantage of the massive amounts of newly available information to assist 
 
REV. 117, 118 (2004) (using a hypothetical about a potentially violent former employee to 
illustrate the precarious situation the employer is faced with when the violent employee’s 
prospective employer calls for a reference); see also Stabile, supra note 39, at 283-84 
(noting the impact of cost on employers’ perceived threat of suit). 
 47.   See Ashby, supra note 46, at 118 (describing the difficult decisions an employer 
must make and factors they must consider when providing a reference to a prospective 
employer). 
 48.  Id. at 119; see also Fact Sheet 16: Employment Background Checks: A Jobseeker’s 
Guide, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (November 2013), available at 
https://www.privacyrights.org/content/employment-background-checks-jobseekers-guide 
(observing that while “[a] former boss can say anything truthful about your performance 
[but] most employers have a policy to only confirm dates of employment, final salary, and 
other limited information”).  
 49.  Ashby, supra note 46,, at 119 ; see also Susan J. Wells, No, Not That John Gotti, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1998), 
http://theater.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/circuits/articles/22chec.html (observing that 
“[m]any employers have adopted a policy of giving only basic information when asked for 
references on former employees because they fear lawsuits”). 
 50.  See infra Section III (discussing why employers seek to gather information on their 
employees). 
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them in their hiring decisions.
51
  A 2009 survey by CareerBuilder.com 
reported that 45% of the 2600 hiring personnel surveyed stated that they 
viewed candidates’ social networking sites as part of the hiring process.
52
  
Additional studies have reported that at least 75% of recruiters and/or 
employers use some type of Internet searching as part of the applicant 
screening process.
53
  Even behemoth employers like Microsoft – a company 
that presumably has a wealth of resources that it could devote to the hiring 
process – cites social media research as a now-typical part of its hiring 
process.
54
  As more and more data about potential workers becomes 
available on the Internet, and as these types of online tools become 
increasingly more sophisticated, employers likely will utilize these tools at 
an ever-growing pace. 
Technology also has made it substantially easier for employers to 
monitor their current employees’ activities.
55
  For example, employers may 
monitor current employees’ Internet usage or email communications, 
particularly when the employee is using an employer-provided computer or 
using the employers’ server for this activity.
56
  If employees are using a 
cellular phone provided by the employer, the employer may examine their 
text messages, voicemails, and/or listen in on their telephone 
conversations.
57
  Employers may record the keystrokes made by the 
 
 51.  Byrnside, supra note 34, at 446-47; see also id. at 456 (citing a “growing trend 
among employers to conduct online background checks of job applicants by searching their 
MySpace and/or Facebook profiles”); see also Margaret Keane et al., Social Networking: 
New Risks of Familiar Liabilities, in PRIVACY & DATA SEC. LAW 2011, 87, 93 (PLI 
Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. G-1049, 2011) (observing that “[e]mployers 
are increasingly and routinely using the Internet to conduct background research on 
applicants and employees to use in making employment decisions”); see also Wendy S. 
Lazar & Lauren E. Schwartzreich, Employee Privacy Rights: Limitations to Monitoring, 
Surveillance and Other Technological Searches in the Private Workplace, in EMP’T 
DISCRIMINATION L. & LITIG., 373, 378 (PLI Litig. & Admin., Prac. Course Handbook Ser. 
No. H-860, 2011) (stating that “[h]uman resource professionals turn increasingly to social 
media for background information on candidates”).  
 52.  See Lazar & Schwartzreich, supra note 51, at 378 (citing the aforementioned 
survey, in which over 600 human resource and recruiting professionals participated). 
 53.  See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 456 (discussing several studies that have shown 
over 75% of employers using the internet to research job applicants); see also Ciocchetti, 
supra note 13, at 285 n.2 (noting that “the majority of employers monitor the electronic 
activities of their employees in some form or another”). 
 54.  See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 456 (discussing Microsoft’s use of social media in 
screening job applicants). 
 55.  See Kim, supra note 6, at 913 (noting that “[w]hile employers have always had an 
interest in monitoring their employees’ activities, technological change has increased both 
the incentives and means to do so”). 
 56.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 307-09, 312-14 (discussing corporate practices in 
monitoring employee email, text messages, and computer usage as well as the practice of 
“Internet Clickstream Monitoring”). 
 57.  Id. at 307-09, 320-21; see also Lazar & Schwartzreich, supra note 51, at 377 
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employee at his/her computer and track the searches conducted by the 
employee via Internet search engines.
58
  Indeed, this type of monitoring has 
become commonplace in the workplace.  A recent study by the American 
Management Association found that 66% of employers monitor their 
employees’ website activities.
59
  43% of employers review their employees’ 
email and 40% analyze the contents of outbound email communications.
60
  
45% of employers track the content, keystrokes, and time that employees 
spend at their keyboards.
61
  45% of employers monitor the time spent by 
employees on telephone calls and/or the numbers called by employees and 
another 16% of employers record employees’ telephone conversations.
62
  
An additional 10% of employers monitor employees’ voicemail 
messages.
63
 
Employer monitoring also extends beyond examining computer and 
telephone usage, involving even more novel methods of tracking 
employees’ activities.  Many employers also may use “access panels” in 
the workplace—electronic devices that control entry into a doorway, 
stairwell, elevator, or other restricted area.
64
  Individuals wishing to enter 
these restricted areas must provide a password, swipe an identification 
card, or utilize fingerprint or iris identification.
65
  These access panels not 
only provide employers with workplace security by preventing 
unauthorized individuals from entering certain areas, but also can allow 
employers to track employee behavior.
66
  By placing access panels on 
restroom or break room doors, for example, employers can monitor 
whether and to what extent employees utilize such facilities.
67
  Employers 
 
(discussing companies’ recent tendencies to request access to employees’ private 
communications through wireless cell phone services); Kim, supra note 6, at 902.   
 58.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 315-16, 320 (discussing the practice of keystroke 
monitoring and search engine monitoring). 
 59.  See 2007 Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance Survey, AMA/ePolicy Institute 
Research, Feb. 8, 2008, cited in Carlin, infra note 102, n.9 (noting the percentages of 
employers that stated in an AMA survey that they review their employees’ email contents, 
keystrokes, and time spent on keyboards, and that have fired employees for internet misuse). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 302 (discussing the use of security access panels 
that require an input from employees in order to enter certain areas of an employer’s 
facility). 
 65.  See id. (discussing the various inputs used for access panels). 
 66.  See id. at 303 (discussing the dual use of access panels for both security and 
employee monitoring). 
 67.  See id. (discussing potential patterns employers would monitor for employee 
movement using access panels).  On a related (but somewhat more extreme) note, some 
employers may use technology to monitor whether employees actually wash their hands 
when using the restroom at work; see also id. at 303-04 n.63 (discussing how at least one 
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SNOOPING EMPLOYERS 565 
 
similarly have used global position systems (GPS) and Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) to monitor the location of their employees and 
property.
68
  These systems can track employees’ specific location within a 
workplace at any given time, and also provide accurate reports on 
employees’ productivity by compiling data regarding the speed at which 
employees are working.
69
  While these technological advances are 
relatively new with respect to their use in the workplace (thus rendering 
their legal status somewhat in flux),
70
 they too represent an area where 
technological advancements have allowed employers to delve even further 
into areas once viewed as private.
71
 
As employers have stepped up their use of creative methods for 
gathering information about employees, one tactic in particular has 
captured the attention of the public, the media, and governmental actors.  In 
recent years, some employers have requested (or in some cases, insisted) 
that prospective and/or current employees provide the employers with 
access to their social media sites.
72
  For example, in 2010, the Maryland 
Department of Corrections asked an employee who was returning to his 
 
company has invested in a device that will detect when an individual enters a restroom, 
identify whether that individual is an employee, and confirm whether that employee 
activates the soap dispenser while in the room.  If the employee fails to activate the soap 
dispenser during the visit to the restroom, then a notification is provided within the room to 
remind that individual that hand washing is required).   
 68.  See id. at 310 (discussing the use of RFID to physically track employees); see also 
Jennifer L. Parent, Advising Clients on Today’s Top Employment Law Issues, in ASPATORE 
THOUGHT LEADERSHIP, EMPLOYMENT LAW 2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY 
STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR *2 (2013) (discussing the use of GPS to physically 
track employees).  
 69.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 310 (noting that RFID tracking can generate real-
time monitoring of employee location within the workplace). 
 70.  See Parent, supra note 68, at *2 (discussing a Supreme Court case that reversed a 
criminal conviction for a failure of law enforcement to get a warrant before using GPS to 
track a suspect, noting a best practice of informing employees of tracking policies, and 
discussing federal cases dealing with the ownership of social media pages); see also 
Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 311-12 (noting that requiring employees to swallow RFID 
chips is illegal in several states). 
 71.  Ironically, this use of technology to “push the envelope” regarding the bounds of 
employee privacy in some cases may work to the detriment of the employer.  Employees 
also increasingly are becoming savvy about the extent to which technology can assist them 
in various workplace situations.  See, e.g., David Koeppel, The Secret Spy Living in Your 
iPhone, THE FISCAL TIMES, July 28, 2011 (describing employee’s use of blackberry device 
to record conversation with a superior during a negative performance review); see also id. 
(discussing one plaintiff attorney’s observation that more than 50% of her potential clients 
possess some type of digital evidence with respect to their claims). 
 72.  See Debra Donston-Miller, Facebook Password Debate Stirs Deep Social Fears, 
INFO. WEEK (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.informationweek.com/thebrainyard/news/social_networking_consumer/2327003
04/facebook-password-debate-stirs-deep-social-fears (discussing Facebook’s reaction to 
employers requesting access to employees’ Facebook pages).  
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position as a security guard following a leave of absence to provide the 
Department of Corrections with his social media login and password.
73
  
According to the Department of Corrections, this request was made in 
order to check for any gang affiliations by the employee.
74
  In another 
instance, a New York statistician interviewing for a new position was asked 
to provide his prospective employer access to his Facebook page.
75
  
Various municipal employers also have put these types of policies in place, 
requiring certain employees – most frequently those working in a security 
or law enforcement capacity – to provide their employers with access to 
their personal social media sites as a condition of employment.
76
 
Even if an employer does not ask a prospective or current employee 
for their social media login credentials, employers can gain access to these 
websites through a variety of other methods.  In some cases, employers 
may ask applicants or employees to log on to a social media site in the 
presence of an employer representative.  This allows the employer to 
review the contents of the site at that time (a practice known as “shoulder 
surfing”).
77
  In other cases, the employer may ask the employee to “friend” 
a staff member of the employer, thereby allowing that individual access to 
the information on the social media site.
78
  Finally, some employers utilize 
third party applications that can scour and collect some of the information 
 
 73.  Manuel Valdes & Shannon McFarland, Employers asking job applicants for 
Facebook passwords, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 20, 2012, available at 
http://news.yahoo.com/employers-ask-job-seekers-facebook-passwords-170500338.html; 
see also Emil Protalinski, Employer demands Facebook login credentials during interview, 
ZDNET (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/employer-demands-facebook-
login-credentials-during-interview/327 (discussing ACLU’s representation of the 
aforementioned job applicant); Leslie Horn, Employers Asking Applicants for Facebook 
Passwords, PC MAG. (Mar. 17, 2012), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2401254,00.asp. 
 74.  See Protalinski, supra note 73 (discussing the Maryland Department of 
Corrections’ reasons for asking for the aforementioned job applicant’s Facebook password). 
 75.  See Valdes & McFarland, supra note 73 (discussing a job applicant’s refusal to 
provide a potential employer with his Facebook password). 
 76.  See Horn, supra note 73 (discussing various situations wherein employers have 
asked for applicants’ Facebook passwords); see also Walter M. Stella, The Importance of 
Compliance with Employment Law in an Ever-Changing, High-Tech Era, in ASPATORE 
THOUGHT LEADERSHIP, EMPLOYMENT LAW 2011: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY 
STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR *5 (2011) (discussing the potential legal implications 
of using social media to monitor employees). 
 77.  See Horn, supra note 73 (describing “shoulder surfing” and noting that it is a 
violation of Facebook’s own terms of use); see also Valdes & McFarland, supra note 73 
(defining “shoulder surfing”). 
 78.  See Valdes & McFarland, supra note 73 (noting that employers are using various 
measures to monitor their employees’ Facebook pages); see also Marie-Andree Weiss, The 
Use of Social Media Sites Data by Business Organizations in their Relationship with 
Employees, J. INTERNET L., Aug. 2011, at 16, 23 (stating that while becoming a friend just to 
“spy” on one’s employee may be legal, it may also raise ethics issues). 
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from an individual’s Facebook profile.
79
 
Predictably, many have denounced this practice as a dramatic 
overreach by employers.  According to one commentator – a law professor 
and former federal prosecutor – “[i]t’s akin to requiring someone’s house 
keys . . ., an egregious privacy violation.”
80
  In the words of another 
observer, “Would we let a potential employer walk around our houses, 
opening drawers, looking at our letters, checking our diaries, little 
blackbooks, and contents of our liquor cabinets?  I think not.”
81
  The 
sponsor of an unsuccessful 2012 Senate bill aimed at outlawing this 
practice referred to these employer requests for social media credentials as 
“an unreasonable and intolerable invasion of privacy.”
82
  Even the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has involved itself in fighting this 
practice.
83
 
 
 79.  See Torie Bosch, Can Legislation Preventing Employers From Requesting 
Facebook Passwords Really Protect Privacy, SLATE (Mar. 28, 2012, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/03/28/employers_don_t_have_to_request_fac
ebook_passwords_to_invade_applicants_privacy_.html (discussing legislation to protect 
employee privacy); Joshua Brustein, Keeping a Closer Eye on Employees’ Social 
Networking, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2010, 6:51 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/keeping-a-closer-eye-on-workers-social-
networking/ (describing a new software that monitors an employee’s social media accounts 
for their employer); Valdes & McFarland, supra note 73 (enumerating additional strategies 
employers use to monitor employees’ social media pages). 
 80.  See Valdez & McFarland, supra note 73 (discussing the measures employers take 
to monitor an employee’s social media page). 
 81.  See Donston-Miller, supra note 72 (describing a movement advocating for 
consequences for employers who violate their employees’ privacy through social media 
sites). 
 82. See Whitney, supra note 1 (describing proposed legislation to restrict employers 
from requesting an employee’s social media information). 
 83.  See Horn, supra note 73 (noting the ACLU’s opposition to “shoulder surfing”); see 
also Emil Protalinski, ACLU: Employers Demanding Facebook Passwords Is Privacy 
Invasion  (Mar. 22, 2012, 10:24 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/aclu-employers-
demanding-facebook-passwords-is-privacy-invasion/10693 (quoting an ACLU attorney’s 
statement that “[i]t’s an invasion of privacy for private employers to insist on looking at 
people’s private Facebook pages as a condition of employment or consideration in an 
application process. . . . People are entitled to their private lives”).  Interestingly, while 
Facebook’s Chief Privacy Officer previously claimed that requesting employees’ and 
applicants’ login information would violate the company’s terms of use, indicating that 
Facebook might take legal action against employers engaged in this practice, the company 
has not yet taken any legal action against any employer and may have backtracked with 
respect to this position.  See Bosch, supra note 79 (discussing attempts to introduce bills to 
protect employee privacy); Anne Fisher, Must You Give a Job Interviewer Your Facebook 
Password?, CNN MONEY (Mar. 28, 2012, 12:08 PM)  
http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/03/28/facebook-password-job-interview/ 
(instructing applicants on declining to give social media password information to a 
prospective employer during an interview); Shel Israel, The Great Facebook Employee 
Password Non-issue, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2012, 8:32 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelisrael/2012/03/25/the-great-facebook-employee-password-
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Yet other observers have criticized the apparent hysteria that has 
surrounded this issue.  According to these commentators, requests for 
social media credentials represent nothing more than “a few clumsy 
missteps by socially backward organizations, or even legitimate steps in the 
vetting of candidates for positions that would require high security 
clearance.”
84
  According to one reporter who has studied this issue, “on 
closer examination it turns out there have been very few reported instances 
of privacy abuse and none of them seem to have happened very recently.”
85
  
According to this reporter, virtually all reported cases of individuals being 
asked to turn over password information involve government positions 
(primarily public safety jobs), and all occurred more than one year ago.
86
  
This reporter could not find an example of a private sector employer 
demanding a prospective or current employee’s social media password.
87
  
Thus, while valid objections to this practice may exist, there is scant 
evidence to indicate any threat of employers demanding social media 
passwords or similar information on a broad scale. 
Moreover, employers have valid reasons for wanting access to this 
information.  Some employers, particularly those in a public safety or 
similar field, may want to check for security risks associated with hiring or 
retaining a particular worker.
88
  Employers likewise may want to review an 
employee’s social media web site(s) to gather important information about 
an employee’s judgment that might not otherwise be available to an 
employer.
89
  Finally, some employers may use employees’ social media 
credentials to more specifically measure an employee’s potential for 
success in a position.  Indeed, at least one recent study has concluded that 
checking a candidate’s Facebook profile may be the best predictor of that 
candidate’s success within a company – significantly more accurate than 
 
nonissue/ (arguing that the media is exaggerating privacy invasions surrounding employees’ 
social media activity). 
 84.  See Donston-Miller, supra note 72 (observers have argued that “when you break 
down the events, this issue is nothing but a tempest in a teapot”). 
 85.  See Israel, supra note 83 (discussing the media’s portrayal of social media abuse by 
employers). 
 86.  See id. (noting that the threat of employers abusing social media has been 
exaggerated). 
 87.  See id. (noting that the threat of misuse of social media by employers, especially 
private employers, is overstated). 
 88.  See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (describing situations where 
employers may feel concerned about the implications of their employees’ social media 
postings). 
 89.  See, e.g., David Mielach, Hiring Managers Reveal Social Media Secrets, BUSINESS 
NEWS DAILY (April 18, 2013), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2377-social-media-
hiring.html (hiring managers have declined to hire candidates who post inappropriate or 
provocative pictures online, and/or whose social media pages include evidence of drinking 
or drug use, poor communication skills, bad-mouthing of a prior employer, or making 
discriminatory comments). 
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even standard personality tests.
90
 
Despite the potential benefits associated with acquiring an applicant’s 
or employee’s social media credentials, and the relatively limited scope in 
which this tactic is used, politicians are responding to this practice with 
predictable fervor.  On the federal level, three members of Congress 
recently introduced the Social Networking Online Protection Act 
(“SNOPA”), designed to limit employers’ access to the login credentials of 
employees’ and applicants’ social media accounts.
91
  The law would 
impose significant fines on employers that request or require any employee 
or applicant to provide the employer with a username, password or other 
means of accessing a private email or social media account, as well as on 
employers that retaliate against individuals who refuse to provide such 
information.
92
  This legislation follows on the heels of successful efforts by 
several states to regulate this area.
93
  Indeed, on the state level, this type of 
legislation has become something of a trend: A recent report by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures asserts that social media privacy 
legislation has been introduced or is in the process of being implemented in 
thirty-five states since the start of 2013.
94
  As states inevitably jump on this 
bandwagon, and as federal lawmakers continue to contemplate their own 
pending legislation, employers are on the verge of losing a powerful tool in 
their information-gathering arsenal. 
 
 90.  See Horn, supra note 73 (citation omitted) (describing “shoulder surfing” and 
identifying employers’ motivation to “shoulder surf”). 
 91.  See Loatman, supra note 1 (describing various states’ proposed legislation to 
prevent employers from violating employees’ privacy rights by monitoring their social 
media). 
 92.  See id. (discussing “SNOPA” and proposed social media privacy legislation in 
different states).  Notably, this legislation represents Congress’s second attempt to regulate 
in this area.  Virtually identical legislation was introduced in Congress in 2012 but failed to 
become law.  Id.  See also Whitney supra note 1 (discussing possible legislative action to 
combat social media abuse by employers). 
 93.  Maryland, Illinois, California, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, Arkansas, 
Washington, Colorado and New Jersey have already enacted legislation that limits employer 
access to social media accounts.  See Loatman supra note 1 (noting progress that has been 
made in legislation that restricts employer access to employees’ social media sites); see also 
Joseph J. Lazzarotti, More states limit employer access to employee social media accounts, 
LEXOLOGY (May 23, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7f39acc0-6ca1-
48be-a4f9-a3348c8d9cf3 (detailing new legislation in states to protect employees privacy); 
Arkansas Enacts Employer, School Social Media Privacy Protection Laws, DAILY LABOR 
REPORT NO. 82, Apr. 29, 2013, at A-8 (describing Arkansas’s new law to restrict both 
employers’ and higher education institutions’ access to prospective students’ and 
employees’ social media password information); Lorraine McCarthy, New Jersey Governor 
Signs Bill Limiting Employer Access to Social Media Accounts, DAILY LABOR REPORT NO. 
168, Aug. 29, 2013, at A-10 (noting a recent law passed in New Jersey prohibiting 
employers from requiring prospective or current employees to give employers their social 
media passwords). 
 94.  Eaglesham & Rothfeld, supra note 3. 
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III. EMPLOYER MOTIVATIONS FOR SNOOPING: WHY 
EMPLOYERS SNOOP 
Employers have adopted a broad range of methods to gather 
information about prospective and/or current employees.  But why are 
employers so fixated on gathering this information in the first place?  Why 
do employers care about who employees might associate with outside of 
work, or about what an individual might post on his/her social media page, 
or about the specific internet sites visited by a (presumably otherwise-
productive) employee?  Some have adhered to the relatively simplistic 
argument that employers choose to peek into their employees’ private lives 
without any legitimate cause.  There are, however, a variety of 
considerations that not only justify employers taking these intrusive steps 
to investigate their workers, but also render such steps prudent and 
necessary. 
A. Financial Motivations for Snooping 
A host of financial considerations motivate employers to monitor their 
employees’ behavior.  These financial concerns play a large role during the 
hiring process.  Given today’s competitive business environment, 
employers must take every possible step to maximize gains and minimize 
losses.  Employers often unnecessarily waste substantial resources as part 
of the hiring process.  Not only is recruiting and interviewing candidates a 
costly endeavor, but employers can also waste significant resources due to 
poor hiring decisions – decisions which ultimately force an employer to 
retrain (or replace) an employee.
95
  Accordingly, employers increasingly 
have directed their resources toward finding an employee who represents 
the best possible “fit” for a position.
96
 
In this respect, the use of technology to snoop into a job applicant’s 
background has become an indispensible part of the hiring process.  As 
 
 95.  See Stabile, supra note 39, at 282-83 & nn.13-14 (observing that “replacing 
employees is costly” and citing statistics placing the cost of replacing one bad hire at “1.5 
times the worker’s salary and benefits”) (citations omitted); see also Jay Goltz, The Hidden 
Costs of Bad Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, 
http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/the-hidden-costs-of-bad-hiring/ (estimating that 
two “bad hires” could cost an employer as much as $40,000 in increased unemployment 
insurance expenses alone, and could run up to $200,000 if the employees’ actions resulted in 
lost customers).  
 96.  See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 448 (noting that “[e]mployers often seek as much 
information as possible about job applicants to ensure the best fit between an applicant and 
the employer’s organization”) (citation omitted); see generally Stabile, supra note 39, at 
279-80 (discussing employers’ use of personality and other tests to eliminate applicants 
possessing negative traits and determine the “fit” between an applicant and any open 
position).  
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noted above, employers have utilized the Internet to research candidates 
with increasing frequency in recent years.
97
  What once may have seemed 
like a significant intrusion on a job applicant’s privacy has now become an 
accepted – and even expected – part of the interview process.
98
  In fact, 
some observers have argued that “it would be irresponsible for an employer 
not to conduct such easy and cost-effective due diligence before hiring or 
promoting employees.”
99
  As this technology becomes even more cost-
efficient in years to come, and as individuals post more and more 
information online, one should expect employers to use this simple and 
cost-effective screening tool with even greater frequency.
100
 
With respect to current employees, employers possess similar 
concerns regarding maximizing profitability and efficiency, and these 
concerns likewise may lead employers to monitor their workers.  In today’s 
workplace, “incessant distractions litter workplaces and entice workers to 
stray from their duties.”
101
  In a depressed business climate where profit 
margins consistently tighten, employers have become increasingly focused 
on eliminating behaviors that might detract from the bottom line.
102
  For 
example, employers want to ensure that employees are not spending 
excessive time surfing the Internet in lieu of performing their duties.  
According to one report, “[e]ven minor personal Internet use in the 
workplace can lead to millions in lost profits.”
103
  This same study 
predicted that “[t]his potential loss may only get worse as the average gen-
y’er spends upwards of thirty four percent of their time online doing 
personal tasks, as opposed to the twenty five percent found in the rest of the 
 
 97.  See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing employers’ surveillance 
of employees’ social media activities).  
 98.  See Weiss, supra note 78, at 16 (describing results of 2009 survey which showed 
that 79% of hiring managers and recruiters in the United States review online information 
about prospective employees, and showing that 75% of U.S. companies surveyed have 
policies requiring employees in charge of hiring to utilize online research). 
 99.  See id. (noting the ease of accessing prospective and current employees’ social 
media pages); Keane, supra note 51, at 93 (citation omitted). 
 100.  See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 453 (observing that “[t]he more economical it 
becomes to obtain information about a potential employee’s private life, the greater the 
likelihood employers will use it”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101.  Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 285 (citation omitted).  
 102.  See Sprague, supra note 5, at 111 (arguing that “[o]ne significant motivation for 
monitoring is performance-based, ensuring that employees are performing their work 
effectively and efficiently, or at all.”) (citation omitted); see also Michael Carlin, Employers 
are Watching Your Facebook: Worker Privacy Significantly Diminished in the Digital Era, 
NAT’L L. F. (June 8, 2011), http://nationallawforum.com/2011/06/08/employers-are-
watching-your-facebook-worker-privacy-significantly-diminished-in-the-digital-era/ (noting 
that “[p]roductivity concerns also cause many employers to monitor employees”). 
 103.  Carlin, supra note 102 (citation omitted); see also Larry Swisher, Nine of 10 
Workers Accept, Like Monitoring of Computer Use by Employers, Survey Finds, DAILY 
LAB. REP., May 24, 2013, at A-13 (estimating business loss due to personal computer use). 
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working population.”
104
  Another study recently found that, for a business 
with 100 employees, the time lost due to non-work-related computer 
activities “is the equivalent of paying nearly seven . . .workers to do 
nothing at a total cost of $385,000 per year in wages . . .”
105
 
Employers likewise may monitor employees to avoid more direct 
types of financial harm.  Excessive personal use of a company’s broadband 
capacity or email accounts may result in decreased productivity, costly 
storage shortages, and/or slower network operations.
106
  Visiting social 
media sites or other unsecure web sites from a company computer can 
introduce data security risks like malware, phishing, or other viruses into 
the employer’s computer system.
107
  In some cases, employers may monitor 
employees to prevent seemingly mundane yet ultimately costly financial 
injuries – for example, using video surveillance to prevent the theft of 
office supplies or other company property.
108
 
One final financial consideration that motivates employers to snoop 
may arise out of a company’s desire to protect its trade secrets.  As one 
commentator observed, “[n]ew technology leads to new ways that 
competitors or employees can steal confidential company information.”
109
  
A 2010 study by a software security company found that an astonishing 
 
 104.  Carlin, supra note 102, n.32 (citation omitted). 
 105.  Swisher, supra note 103. 
 106.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 286 (explaining companies’ rationale for 
monitoring employee computer use) (citation omitted). 
 107.  See Weiss, supra note 78, at 19 (detailing the ease of contracting viruses and 
malware through social media links); see also Paul M. Secunda, King and Spalding’s 
Surprising New Email Policy, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2013), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2013/04/king-and-spaldings-surprising-
new-email-policy.html (implementing an email policy under which firm employees are 
barred from accessing any personal email accounts (i.e., anything other than the individual’s 
kslaw.com email account) from any firm computer, or from any computer connected to the 
firm’s computer network).  In implementing its policy, King & Spalding cited advice from 
both internal and outside security experts indicating that accessing personal email accounts 
from firm computers could create a significant security risk to the firm and its clients.  Id.  
The firm further noted that “individual users who innocently click on malicious e-mails are 
often the cause of security breaches.”  Id.  
 108.  See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 322 (detailing the reasons companies employ 
video surveillance in the workplace) (citation omitted); see also Alexis C. Madrigal, Dunkin 
Donuts’ Employee Surveillance Cut Thefts Up to 13%, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/04/dunkin-donuts-employee-
surveillance-cut-thefts-up-to-13/256152/ (asserting the broad use of video surveillance by 
fast-food restaurants, which lose approximately seven percent of sales due to employee 
theft); cf. Stabile, supra note 39, at 281 n.7 (citing a 1991 study that estimates the direct cost 
to employers of employee theft as close to $50 billion, as well as other studies placing the 
cost at $40 billion) (citations omitted). 
 109.  Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 473-74; see also Weiss, supra note 78, at 19 
(detailing the possibility of employees leaking confidential information or trade secrets 
through use of social media). 
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SNOOPING EMPLOYERS 573 
 
94% of users of one large social networking site readily accepted a “friend 
request” from a complete stranger (who happened to be presented to them 
as a pretty young woman).
110
  Even more shocking, when this same study 
then selected twenty of the individuals who had accepted the friend request 
and engaged them in real-time conversation online, 73% of the sample had 
– within a mere two hours of conversation – revealed to this new “friend” 
confidential information belonging to their employer, including business 
strategies and information about unreleased products.
111
  In 2004, even 
Apple – a company known for keeping its trade secrets under wraps – 
discovered confidential information about unreleased products posted on a 
publicly-accessible Internet bulletin board.
112
  The disclosure of this type of 
proprietary information can cost a business hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in any given year: a 2001 survey in which 138 Fortune 1000 
companies reported data, the survey authors concluded that losses of 
proprietary information and intellectual property ranged between $53 billon 
and $59 billion in a single year.
113
 
B. Concerns About Liability Prevention as a Motivation for Snooping 
(“Prophylactic Monitoring”) 
On top of the financial incentives that might motivate an employer to 
snoop, employers also may feel compelled to monitor employees as a 
means of preventing legal exposure in various areas.  For example, as 
discussed in greater detail below,
114
 employees who use workplace 
computers or other employer-provided equipment to browse pornographic 
web sites, display sexually explicit content, or disseminate racially 
insensitive material may expose their employers to liability in a harassment 
or discrimination case.
115
  In some disturbing news for employers, some 
 
 110.  Weiss, supra note 78, at 20 (citation omitted). 
 111.  Id. (citation omitted); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 286 (stating that 
“[f]ailing to monitor [employees properly may]  allow rogue employees to steal trade secrets 
or send out confidential information in violation of various federal and state laws”) 
(citations omitted). 
 112.  Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 474.  
 113.  U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 
1 (2002), available at www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/issues/technology/files/ 
informationloss2.pdf.  Notably, an entire cottage industry has arisen to take advantage of 
these types of concerns.  One online communication services company recently launched a 
new type of software, called Social Sentry, designed to help employers monitor their 
employees’ Facebook and Twitter accounts, with one focus being to help employers watch 
for the release of confidential or embarrassing information.  See Brustein, supra note 79 
(describing Teneros’ social media monitoring service).  
 114.  See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the incentives of utilizing employee computer 
surveillance to avoid liability for hostile workplace claims). 
 115.  See Kim, supra note 6, at 913 (observing that “employers now also fear that 
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studies have indicated that over 20% of all email users have received 
sexually explicit email in the workplace.
116
  Similarly, employees may 
abuse their employer’s email system through a practice called “spoofing”—
intentionally sending messages that appear to be from someone else—in 
order to harass the recipient or otherwise disseminate an inappropriate 
message.
117
  In either circumstance, these inappropriate emails or other 
Internet activities can form the basis of harassment or other lawsuits against 
an employer.
118
  By monitoring employees’ use of the employer’s Internet 
and email systems, an employer may be able to learn of—and eliminate—
such inappropriate usage before it can create a hostile environment or other 
negative ramifications for employees.
119
 
Employees’ disclosure of confidential or other proprietary information 
also can create potential liability for employers, thus motivating employers 
to monitor workers in order to prevent these disclosures.  For example, an 
“[e]mployee[‘s] mishandling of electronic files could also result in 
improper disclosure of customers’ private information or other security 
breaches[.]”
120
  In one fairly unusual case, the personal information of Shell 
Oil Company employees in dangerous parts of the world was leaked to a 
blogger and subsequently published, posing a threat to the lives and well-
being of these workers.
121
  Had harm befallen any of the workers whose 
information was made public, Shell might have been concerned about its 
own liability for failing to prevent this leak from taking place.  Similar 
arguments about the need to prevent harms caused by leaked information 
have been cited by Wall Street to justify its efforts at snooping: In opposing 
the rash of new legislation that limits employer access to employees’ social 
media accounts, securities regulators have expressed concern that “the raft 
of new laws aimed at protecting employees’ privacy puts investors at 
 
employee misuse of electronic communications will . . . giv[e] rise to charges of racial or 
sexual harassment . . . .”) (citation omitted); see also Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 443 
(stating that inappropriate emails may serve as evidence in sexual harassment and/or 
discrimination suits) (citation omitted). 
 116.  See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 79 (Vintage Books 2001) (2000) (discussing the privacy of employees’ 
communications in the workplace). 
 117.  Rosenberg, supra note 13,, at 443-44. 
 118.  See id. at 443 (describing the exposure to litigation caused by e-mail misuse); see 
also Ciocchetti, supra note 13,, at 285 (emphasizing employers’ disdain for exposure to 
liability caused by employees’ misuse of workplace technology). 
 119.  See infra at Section IV.B.1 (concluding that an employer’s incentive for monitoring 
extends beyond just preventing the creation of a sexually hostile environment, and that such 
monitoring may be essential to forming an affirmative defense for any harassment claims 
that ultimately are brought against the employer). 
 120.  Kim, supra note 6, at 913 (citations omitted). 
 121.  See Carlin, supra note 102 (discussing the possibility of kidnapping and insider 
trading based on the leaked information). 
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risk.”
122
  These regulators worry that the rapid dissemination of financial 
advice on social networks like Facebook and Twitter “could create new 
channels for Ponzi schemes and other frauds,”
123
 and argue that fighting 
these frauds will be complicated by state laws that bar employers from 
monitoring what their employees pitch to investors.
124
 
Employers also might snoop into ostensibly private areas of their 
employees’ (or, more typically, prospective employees’) lives out of a 
concern over liability for negligent hiring.  While the standards for 
determining liability in this area may vary somewhat from one jurisdiction 
to the next, most jurisdictions examine whether an employer knew, or 
should have known, of an employee’s unfitness for a position or dangerous 
propensities.
125
  In at least one jurisdiction, courts applying this standard 
will focus on “the adequacy of the employer’s pre-employment 
investigation into the employee’s background” in determining the 
employer’s liability for negligent hiring.
126
  This emphasis on employers 
conducting a “reasonable investigation” before hiring a new worker 
provides further motivation for an employer to snoop as part of the hiring 
process.  What exactly constitutes a “reasonable investigation”?  How 
deeply should a prospective employer dig?  An employer nowadays likely 
would be expected at least to conduct a basic Internet search before hiring 
an individual.
127
  Indeed, with so much information now available over the 
Internet—and with Internet searches rapidly becoming a standard part of 
the hiring process—an employer may appear negligent if it does not engage 
in such pre-hiring “snooping.”
128
  If a candidate’s Facebook page is 
plastered with images of him holding assault weapons, abusing small 
animals, or snorting cocaine—and if the candidate then engages in similar 
threatening or illegal activity once hired by an employer—a jury likely 
would be hard-pressed to find that such readily-available clues would fall 
outside the scope of the employer’s reasonable investigation. 
Quite simply, employers need to know if a prospective or current 
employee is a drug addict, a criminal, or has violent tendencies.  If the 
 
 122.  Eaglesham & Rothfeld, supra note 3. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See Id. ( “Wall Street’s self-regulator, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 
says financial firms need a way to follow up on ‘red flags’ suggesting misuse of a personal 
account”). 
 125.  See Weiss, supra note 78, at 18 (citing Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 
911 (Minn. 1983)). 
 126.  Weiss, supra note 78, at 18 (citing Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1986)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 127.  See supra notes 51-54, 97-100 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See Weiss, supra note 78, at 18 (arguing that “[w]ith the prevalence of search 
engine use to search for information, particularly information about a person, a plaintiff in a 
negligent hiring case might indeed argue that propensities leading to the employee harming 
the plaintiff could have been discovered by searching the web, SMS included”). 
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easiest way to discover this information involves a bit of snooping, then 
employers should be given a bit of latitude to pursue such channels.  
Otherwise, employers will find themselves between a rock and a hard 
place—responsible for protecting the health and safety of their workforce 
and the public, but deprived of one of the most effective tools for 
implementing this protection. 
C. Reputational Concerns as a Motivation for Snooping 
Related both to the aforementioned financial motivations for snooping 
and to concerns about potential legal liability, a third motivation behind 
employers’ decision to snoop stems from employers’ reputational concerns.  
Most employers likely have little interest in the details of their employees’ 
personal lives:  they likely are not particularly intrigued by their 
employees’ vacation photos, weekend plans, or Facebook posts about their 
children’s latest witty statements.  Rather, many employers may monitor 
their employees’ out-of-work conduct out of a concern for how that 
employee may be representing the employer.  Is an employee making 
disparaging statements about the employer?  Is he or she disclosing 
information that the employer would prefer to keep secret?  Is the 
employee mischaracterizing some part of the employer’s operations?  Such 
questions understandably would concern any employer. 
The injection of technology into the workplace has raised the stakes 
with respect to these reputational concerns, rendering an employer’s 
reputation even more vulnerable than it was in the past.  In the past, 
employers could maintain tremendous control over virtually all 
communications made on behalf of the company.  Simply by controlling 
employees’ access to the company’s pre-printed letterhead and stationery, 
employers could limit the ability of an unauthorized employee to send 
communications in the company’s name.
129
  Now, with email as the 
dominant form of workplace communication (and with email accounts that 
typically include an employer’s domain name or other identifying 
information), employers have enabled virtually every employee to 
communicate with others in the workforce (and with the outside world) in a 
manner that bears the employer’s imprimatur.
130
  Moreover, in the past, 
communications themselves generally were handwritten or typed with 
deliberation and care, and were delivered by “snail mail” or, if urgent, by 
hand.
131
  Now, with email emerging as the preferred form of 
 
 129.  See Keane, supra note 51, at 91 (discussing how employers in the past could 
control access to the ability to speak on the company’s behalf by controlling who could use 
company letterhead and stationery). 
 130.  See id. at 91-92. 
 131.  See id. at 91. 
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SNOOPING EMPLOYERS 577 
 
communication, employees communicate using far less care than in days 
gone by.  Instead of carefully typed or handwritten communications, 
individuals frequently dash off email messages with far less reflection and 
prudence, and then can disseminate that those messages to innumerable 
outsiders with the mere push of a “send” button.”
132
  As one commentator 
has observed, “the days of true [employer] control [over employee 
communications] are relics of another era.”
133
 
For employers, the impact of such cavalier communications on their 
reputation can be devastating.  In May 2008, for example, Angelo Mozilo, 
then-CEO of Countrywide Financial, mistakenly replied to a distressed 
debtor who had contacted Countrywide desperately seeking assistance with 
mortgage restructuring.
134
  In his “misdirected” reply email, Mr. Mozilo 
wrote, “This is unbelievable.  Most of these letters now have the same 
wording.  Obviously they are being counseled by some other person or by 
the Internet.  Disgusting.”
135
  When Mr. Mozilo’s email ultimately was 
widely circulated on the Internet and in the news media, it led to significant 
embarrassment for Countrywide.
136
  An equally destructive situation (not 
directly involving email) arose in April 2009, when two Domino’s Pizza 
employees inflicted immeasurable damage upon their employer after 
posting online several videos of unsanitary and disgusting acts engaged in 
during the preparation of a customer’s pizza.
137
  After the video ultimately 
went viral, Domino’s experienced a steep decline in its stock values.
138
  In 
 
 132.  See id. (stating that “[e]mployees are able to communicate instantaneously and 
with an audience of unlimited scope” and modern-day correspondence “is sent[] with the tap 
of the Send button, often only seconds after the email or document is composed”). 
 133. Id.  
 134.  See Janice Mac Avoy et al., Think Twice Before You Hit The Send Button! 
Practical Considerations In The Use Of Email, PRAC. LAW, Dec. 2008 at 45, 46 (citation 
omitted) (discussing the harm of inadvertently forwarding an impolite internal message to 
the original sender). 
 135.  Id. at 46. 
 136.  See id (discussing the spread of the email online).  For an additional example of a 
negative email damaging an employer’s reputation, see Kim States, Oh the social lessons 
learned when internal email goes viral, INSIDE TUCSON BUS (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.insidetucsonbusiness.com/news/profiles/oh-the-social-lessons-learned-when-
internal-email-goes-viral/article_e1343a86-4dc6-11e1-8f04-
0019bb2963f4.html#.UTkeoXeTmyE.mailto (discussing the impact of a marketing firm’s 
rude email exchange with a dissatisfied customer becoming public). 
 137.  See Carlin, supra note 102 (discussing employers’ need to protect their businesses 
against unlawful activity, including the fallout from two Domino’s Pizza employees 
preparing a customer’s pizza in an unsanitary manner). 
 138.  See id. (discussing decline in stock value as the fallout from the Dominos viral 
video scandal); see also Kerry M. Lavelle, Why Every Employer Should Adopt a Social 
Media Networking Policy, CONSTR. EQUIP. DISTRIB. (Aug. 1, 2010), 
http://www.cedmag.com/article-detail.cfm?id=10926254 (describing damage to reputation 
of Burger King chain after video of Burger King employee taking bath in workplace sink 
was electronically distributed to YouTube, MySpace, the health department, and to Burger 
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this way, an employer’s hard-earned reputation can be shattered by careless 
or malicious employee behavior, since email and other social media allow 
an isolated incident of misconduct or poor judgment to become public 
fodder.  In the words of one commentator, “[n]ever before has so much 
damage been accomplished by low level employees through mindless 
behavior and social media.”
139
  By monitoring employee conduct in the 
workplace, as well as communications that employees make about the 
workplace, employers may be able to limit or even avoid this type of 
damage. 
Concerns about protecting their own reputations seem particularly 
relevant in motivating employers to monitor their employees’ social media 
postings.
140
  As noted above, employees frequently exhibit little inhibition 
in posting a glut of information, including their employers’ confidential or 
other proprietary information, on social media sites.
141
  Employees’ social 
media postings may also spread negative aspersions about an employer, 
such as in one recent case involving a police officer who posted 
accusations of department corruption on her Facebook page.
142
  Employers 
have an interest in quelling this type of public disparagement  Just as an 
employee would expect his or her employer not to publicize on its 
company Facebook page the results of the employee’s negative 
performance review or the reasons for (or even mere fact of) the 
 
King’s management). 
 139.  Carlin, supra note 102. 
 140.  See generally Lawrence E. Dubé, NLRB’s Solomon Tackles Social Media Cases, 
Giving Wal-Mart Policy Revision a Green Light, DAILY LAB. REP., May 31, 2012, at AA-1, 
available at http://www.bna.com/nlrbs-solomon-tackles-n12884909814/ (discussing the 
significant attention the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has devoted to crafting 
guidelines for employers to use in setting workplace policies for social media use); see also 
Mercedes Colwin & Bran C. Noonan, Navigating the Social Media Policy Minefield, 
GORDON & REES LLP (June 2012), 
http://www.gordonrees.com/publications/viewPublication.cfm?contentID=2692 (advising 
“[e]mployers looking to implement policies governing the use of social media by employees 
in the workplace . . . to devise policies that do not conflict with the [NLRA], which may be 
challenging to accomplish”); Michael O. Loatman, Attorney Says NLRB Appointments 
Dispute Doesn’t Change Social Media Policies Advice, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 6, 2003, at 
A-8 (citing the perspective of a practicing attorney in this area that the NLRB recently has 
been “‘aggressive’ in policing social media policies,” frequently finding problems with 
confidentiality provisions appearing in such policies, as well as with provisions that regulate 
the “postings or public comments about [a] company,” or that bar “negative or disparaging 
comments about [a] company”). 
 141.  See supra notes 110-11 (discussing a recent study that exposed employees’ 
willingness to “friend” and discuss confidential business information with total strangers on 
a social media site). 
 142.  See Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2012 WL 1600439, *1 
(N.D. Ga. May 7, 2012) (holding that police department did not violate police officer’s free 
speech rights when it denied officer a promotion after she posted accusations of department 
corruption on her Facebook page). 
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employee’s termination, so too does the employer have the right to expect 
its employees not to disparage the company in the online community. 
 
D. The “New Normal”: Advances in Technology and Changing 
Employee Expectations as a Motivation for Snooping 
 
One final reason for the increase in employer snooping is that this type 
of behavior has become significantly easier to implement.  First, as noted 
above, technology has become an increasingly prevalent part of the modern 
workplace,
143
 frequently making it less costly for employers to gather 
information about prospective and current employees.  With the increasing 
availability of computer databases that contain millions of records of 
personal data about individuals, the cost of searching these sources drops 
for employers.
144
  One recent study conducted by a University of Denver 
professor demonstrated just how easily (and inexpensively) a wealth of 
personal information can be accessed by a third party: By providing some 
minimal information and paying $29.95 to an online investigations 
company, this professor was able to receive—within a mere 15 minutes—
an extensive personal dossier on himself.
145
  With such a wealth of 
information available at such a low cost, searches that once resided in the 
toolbox of only large and resource-rich companies now may seem feasible 
to a broad range of employers.
146
 
To a certain extent, these advances in technology create a cyclical 
phenomenon, culminating in an attrition of privacy rights:  the more 
technology advances, the more that certain intrusions which once would 
have seemed astonishing now may appear mundane—and even expected.  
In the recent Quon case (discussed further below),
147
 for example, the 
Supreme Court observed the extent to which social norms play a significant 
role in shaping the reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of 
privacy.
148
  According to the Court, “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of 
communication and information transmission are evident not just in the 
 
 143.  See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text (discussing employers’ use of the 
Internet to gather information about prospective and current employees and to monitor the 
activities of employees); see also Bentzen, supra note 6, at 1293 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (stating that “[n]ew technology has been injected into the 
workplace at an exponentially increasing rate over the last few decades”). 
 144.  PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 48. 
 145.  Sprague, supra note 5, at 88 (citation omitted). 
 146.  Fact Sheet 16, supra note 48.  
 147.  See infra Part IV.A (discussing the impact of City of Ontario v. Quon). 
 148.  Keane, supra note 51, at 114. 
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technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.”
149
  In a 
similar vein, Professor Jeffrey Rosen, a noted scholar in the area of privacy 
law, has expressed surprise at the passivity with which Americans have 
acceded to encroachments into their private lives, wondering about the 
“tepid response to the increasing surveillance of our personal and private 
life.”
150
  Employees seem to expect—and accept—that their employers are 
engaging in some form of workplace monitoring.  As technology makes it 
easier for companies to do so, their employees’ expectations of privacy 
decrease even further.
151
 
One additional and related result of this increase in technology in the 
workplace has been that areas of an employee’s life once deemed entirely 
personal now have become fair game for employer scrutiny: the “personal” 
has begun to blur with the “professional.”
152
  Employees use their 
employer-provided cell phones to make personal calls or send personal 
texts; they send work-related email from their personal home computer; 
they may keep all of their appointments—personal and professional—on a 
single electronic calendar.
153
  As one commentator observed, “[g]iven the 
ubiquity of electronic communications in both business and social life, it is 
unrealistic to expect that employees will never use employer-provided 
systems to communicate about personal matters.”
154
  Yet once personal data 
makes its way into the workplace—in particular, when such data is dragged 
into the workplace by the employee him or herself—does the employer 
have an obligation to ignore that information?  While employees object 
strenuously to what they see as employers snooping into their personal 
lives, perhaps the problem is not an excessive snooping by employers, but 
 
 149.  City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010); see also Noyce, 
supra note 7, at 29 (stating that the “circumstances of the workplace and the actions taken 
by the employer will dictate whether an employee’s expectation of privacy is reasonable”); 
Sprague, supra note 5, at 86-88 (observing that there is a link between the degree of 
surveillance Americans undergo and the increase in workplace monitoring). 
 150.  Rosen, supra note 116, at 25. 
 151.  Sprague, supra note 5, at 89. 
 152.  See generally Kim, supra note 6, at 910-14 (citations omitted) (discussing how 
technological advances blur the distinction between work and home); see also Noyce, supra 
note 7, at 29 (noting the “growing use of technology in the workplace, [and] the feeble 
boundaries between work and home”). 
 153.  Kim, supra note 6, at 911-12 (citations omitted); see also Christine Neylon 
O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act: Exploring the Limits of Labor Law Protection for Concerted Communication on Social 
Media, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 29 (2011) (discussing how “[s]martphones and other 
portable Internet data generators such as iPads, and even Internet hotspots incorporated into 
motor vehicles, have encouraged the blurring of work and personal time such that people are 
tethered to their devices, checking their work and personal messages wherever they are and 
whatever else they are doing”); Rosen, supra note 116, at 84 (discussing how technology 
has broken down boundaries between the home and the office). 
 154.  See Kim, supra note 6, at 911 (citation omitted). 
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rather an inability by employers to separate irrelevant personal information 
from highly relevant, professional information. 
Finally, not only has the amount of technology in the workplace 
increased (along with individuals’ reaction to such technology), but the 
manner in which employees conduct themselves overall has also evolved in 
recent years.  Individuals in all walks of life generally seem more willing to 
live their lives on display, not only tolerating others’ efforts to monitor 
their behavior, but in fact often encouraging such attention.  Many of the 
newest members of the workforce belong to the so-called “Facebook 
Generation,” a group so identified because of its tendency to share the 
minutiae of daily life with all of their hundreds of Facebook “friends.”
155
  
According to one self-proclaimed member of this cohort, “[m]y generation 
has long been bizarrely comfortable with being looked at, and as 
performers on the Facebook stage, we upload pictures of ourselves cooking 
dinner for our parents or doing keg stands at last night’s party; we are 
reckless with our personal information.”
156
  Indeed, “[t]he new Internet 
generation doesn’t seem to have the privacy hang ups or suspicions their 
parents had about sharing information with strangers over the net.”
157
 
In many ways, this over-sharing mentality facilitates and encourages 
employer snooping.  Not only does this open and permissive attitude 
inherently make more information available to employers as employees 
more freely share their personal data, but this demeanor also actively 
undermines employees’ objections to employer snooping.  To a certain 
extent, individuals subject to monitoring seem to forget that the cameras or 
other surveillance devices are there: examples abound of employees who 
have been told that their email will be monitored, but who continue to send 
offensive or inappropriate messages,
158
 or of individuals who “knew” that 
 
 155.  See What is the Facebook Generation?, WISEGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-facebook-generation.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) 
(stating that the “Facebook generation is a title used to identify those who are growing up in 
a world where the use of online social networking is common”); see also Kalena Jordan, 
Social Networking and the Overshare Generation, SITEPRONEWS (Aug. 24, 2010), 
http://www.sitepronews.com/2010/08/24/social-networking-and-the-overshare-generation/ 
(stating that “[t]he premise is that everyone in your social circle not only wants to know but 
NEEDS to know when you are buying that tall frappuccino from @starbucks. That they 
need to know precisely where you are and what you are doing every minute of the day.”). 
 156.  Alice Mathias, The Fakebook Generation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/06/opinion/06mathias.html?_r=0. 
 157.  Jordan, supra note 155. 
 158.  See, e.g., Franklin v. MIQ Logistics, LLC, No. 10–2234–EFM, 2011 WL 3205774, 
at *1, *2 (D. Kan. July 28, 2011) (describing inappropriate emails sent by employee despite 
company policy informing employees that company could monitor computer usage, 
including emails, without prior notice); Ernst v. Sumner Grp., Inc., 264 S.W.3d 669, 670-71 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that employee sent two inappropriate emails, including emails 
with photographs of a naked man, a picture of a woman with her breast and nipple exposed, 
and a racially-derogatory email, despite an email policy informing employees that they have 
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they were on camera but nonetheless behaved in objectively embarrassing 
ways.
159
  Others have written about the “innate tension between an 
employee intentionally making information public and feeling that her 
information is private.”
160
  Employees cannot have it both ways.  They 
cannot throw open the doors to their private lives, and then protest when 
they do not like who enters.  While employees may claim not to be 
comfortable with employers monitoring their actions, their conduct often 
tells a different story.
161
 
IV. ROLE OF THE COURTS IN PERMITTING – AND PERHAPS 
EVEN ENCOURAGING – SNOOPING 
On top of the various legal and practical concerns that motivate 
employers to snoop, the courts themselves have played a significant role in 
encouraging this type of employer behavior.  In some instances, the courts 
have adopted a surprisingly permissive attitude toward employer snooping, 
issuing decisions that leave employers with broad leeway to monitor 
employees without any legal sanction.  In a handful of cases, the courts 
have gone even further, by actually creating strong incentives that 
encourage employers to snoop. 
A. Uncertain Boundaries as Making Way for Employers to Snoop: The 
Impact of City of Ontario v. Quon 
One way in which the courts contribute to many employers’ decision 
to snoop relates to their failure to create clear legal guidelines regarding 
what employers can and cannot do in monitoring their workers.  As 
discussed in detail above, the modern workplace abounds with new and 
 
“no expectation of privacy” in emails sent from the employer’s system). 
 159.  In my Employment Law course, I refer to this as the “Real World Phenomenon,” 
named after the popular MTV reality show.  See MTV, 
http://www.mtv.com/search/?q=real+world (featuring a reality show documenting strangers 
selected to live together).  See also Terry Morrow, Melissa Howard talks about ‘Real 
World,’ THECABIN.NET (Nov. 3, 2000), http://thecabin.net/stories/110300/sty_1103000054. 
html (commenting that despite knowing that cameras will record their every word and 
movement throughout the season, cast members of that show repeatedly have claimed that, 
after a while, they would “forget the camera is there.”); Wayne Laepple, Back in ‘The Real 
World” [sic], THE DAILY ITEM (June 21, 2007), 
http://dailyitem.com/0300_entertainment/x691265744/Back-in-The-Real-World (quoting a 
former cast member’s advice that “[y]ou have to try to be real and forget the camera crew”). 
 160.  Noyce, supra note 7, at 28-29. 
 161.  One recent study purports to find that the vast majority of workers do not mind 
being monitored by their employers.  See Swisher, supra note 103, (claiming that “nine out 
of 10 workers accept or welcome having their computer activities monitored by their 
employers during work hours”).   
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often cutting-edge technology—technology that has altered the manner in 
which many employers do business.
162
  These technological developments 
have outpaced the law in many respects, and courts are grappling with how 
to fit these new devices and systems within their traditional “privacy” 
jurisprudence.
163
  With respect to the hot-button issue of an employer’s 
ability to monitor an employee’s Facebook postings, for example, one 
federal judge recently observed that the courts “have not yet developed a 
coherent approach” for determining what expectations of privacy 
individuals may have in such postings.
164
  This legal grey area frequently 
opens the door for employers to expand the extent to which they monitor 
their workers, either because they do not believe that there are any hard-
and-fast rules that will prohibit this type of behavior, or because they 
simply do not know where to fix the outer boundaries of acceptable 
monitoring. 
One telling example of the courts’ failure to set boundaries with 
respect to employer monitoring arose in the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision 
in City of Ontario, California. v. Quon.  In Quon, the plaintiff, Jeff Quon, 
was employed as a police sergeant and member of the Special Weapons 
and Tactics Team of the City of Ontario, California Police Department.
165
  
In 2001, the City provided Quon and several coworkers with alphanumeric 
pagers to use in executing their work duties.
166
  Prior to acquiring and 
distributing these pagers, the City had communicated to all employees a 
“Computer Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy” that stated, inter alia, that 
the City “reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity 
including e–mail and Internet use, with or without notice.”
167
  While this 
policy did not explicitly apply to text messages, the City made clear to 
employees, including Quon, that it would cover text messages as well.
168
 
Shortly after the City distributed these pagers, Quon exceeded his 
monthly text message character allotment, resulting in an additional fee for 
 
 162.  See supra notes 51-71. 
 163.  See, e.g., Kim, supra note 6, at 914 (noting that “[t]he current law of privacy is not 
well equipped to address these developments in the workplace”); Carlin, supra note 102, at 
1 (asserting that “[s]tate and federal common law and statutory protections developed during 
the past twenty years . . .  fail to provide adequate protection in light of technological 
advances that make employer monitoring simple, cheap, and surreptitious.”); Sprague, supra 
note 5, at 89-90 (focusing on “what happens when technology outstrips the law’s ability to 
protect employees from it”); cf. Byrnside, supra note 34, at 459 (observing that “[t]his new 
method of employer information gathering is extremely different from its predecessors”). 
 164.  Ehling v. Monmouth Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.N.J. 
2012). 
 165.  Quon, supra note 149, at 2624-25. 
 166.  Id. at 2625. 
 167.  Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168.  Id. 
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the City – a practice that continued in subsequent months.
169
  While Quon’s 
superior verbally represented that the City would not monitor employees’ 
text messages so long as the employees themselves paid any overage 
fees,
170
 the City eventually requested and reviewed the transcripts of 
messages sent by Quon and others (purportedly to determine the 
sufficiency of the existing character limit associated with the pagers).
171
  
Upon finding that the vast majority of messages sent by Quon during work 
hours were not work-related, the Police Department disciplined Quon.
172
  
Quon subsequently sued, claiming, inter alia, a violation of his privacy 
rights under both the Stored Communications Act and the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution.
173
 
In examining the validity of Quon’s claims, the Supreme Court 
significantly declined to decide a very basic question: Whether Quon 
actually possessed any “reasonable expectation of privacy in the text 
messages sent” over his employer-provided pager.
174
  Noting that “[t]he 
Supreme Court must proceed with care when considering the whole 
concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic 
equipment owned by a government employer[,]”
175
 the Court simply 
assumed that such a reasonable expectation of privacy existed and 
proceeded accordingly, ultimately holding that the City’s conduct did not 
violate Quon’s supposed “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the pager 
because the City’s search was motivated by a legitimate work purpose and 
was not excessive in scope.
176
 
In some respects, one can understand the Supreme Court’s reluctance 
to stake out a position regarding whether an employee in fact should be 
deemed to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-
provided pager or similar device.  Noting the “[r]apid changes in the 
 
 169.  Id. at 2625-26. 
 170.  Id. at 2625. 
 171.  Id. at 2626. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Notably, Quon arose in a government workplace, where employees’ privacy rights 
may differ substantially from those applicable to private sector workers.  See supra note 6.  
However, as many have observed, this case can be seen as a signal for how a court would 
analyze a similar dispute in the private sector.  See, e.g., Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court 
Ruling in “Quon” Highlight Importance of Employer Technology-Usage and Privacy 
Policies, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (June 18, 2010), 
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/USSupremeCourtRulinginQuon.aspx, (noting 
that “[a]lthough Quon involved a government employer, the importance of employment 
policies clearly eliminating expectations of privacy in communications made on employer-
owned devices or systems is equally applicable to private-sector employers”); cf. Secunda, 
supra note 6 (arguing that the Court’s decision in Quon functions to reduce privacy rights of 
public sector employees to the level of employees in the private sector).  
 174.  Quon, supra note 149, at 2630. 
 175.  Id. at 2629.   
 176.  Id. at 2630-33. 
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dynamics of communication and information transmission[,]” the Court 
correctly observed that it likely would encounter “difficulty predicting how 
employees’ privacy expectations will be shaped by those changes or the 
degree to which society will be prepared to recognize those expectations as 
reasonable.”
177
  Yet by failing to make clear to employers and employees 
what amount of privacy (if any) they should expect in these types of 
devices, the Court arguably made it easier for employers to increase their 
scrutiny in this area: If employers can assume that employees may not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-provided device, then 
they likely will exhibit less hesitation in monitoring its use.  In other words, 
given the numerous very real concerns that motivate employers to snoop, 
many employers–in the absence of a “no” from the Supreme Court-will 
choose to take their chances and expand their monitoring of employees. 
This idea that ambiguity from the Supreme Court could lead to 
increased monitoring by employers is more than mere academic 
speculation.  In the wake of the Quon decision, various law firms that 
represent employers sent updates to their clients, advising them regarding 
how the Court’s decision in Quon might enable them to engage in a similar 
type of monitoring.  Citing the Court’s observation that “employer policies 
concerning communications will . . . shape the reasonable expectations of 
their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly 
communicated,”
178
 many employer-side law firms simply advised their 
clients to do things like “expressly include all forms of electronic 
communications in written technology-usage and privacy policies, and to 
ensure that these policies are clearly communicated and consistently 
applied.”
179
  According to these advisors, it seems, the Court’s failure to 
draw a clear line in Quon regarding the actual scope of an employee’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in employer-provided devices means that 
employers wishing to snoop into communications made on such devices 
simply must draft, publish and disseminate a clear warning to employees 
that such monitoring will occur – not a particularly heavy burden for 
 
 177.  Id. at 2629-30. 
 178.  Quon, supra note 149, at 2630. 
 179.  GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, supra note 173; see City of Ontario vs. Quon: The 
Supreme Court Weighs In On Employee Privacy Expectations, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP 
(June 23, 2010), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_le_ontariovsquon_062310/ (including in its 
“practical guidance” for employers advice regarding how effectively to expand the scope of 
an employer’s communications/ monitoring policy); Supreme Court Unanimously Upholds 
Employer Ability to Access and Search Employee Messages Under Reasonable 
Circumstances, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (June 23, 2010), http://www.sidley.com/Supreme-
Court-Unanimously-Upholds-Employer-Ability-to-Access-and-Search-Employee-
Messages-Under-Reasonable-Circumstances-06-23-2010/ (“Clear policies should be 
established and implemented to ensure that monitoring and searches are reasonable in the 
given circumstances”). 
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employers.
180
  All it takes to strip employees of their privacy rights is a bit 
of notice. 
B. Court-Created Incentives for Employers to Snoop: The Court’s 
Hostile Environment and Third-Party Retaliation Jurisprudence 
While the courts’ failure to establish concrete limits on monitoring in 
cases like Quon arguably make it permissible for employers to snoop, 
several decisions by the Supreme Court have gone even further.  In some 
instances, the Court has rendered decisions and established legal doctrines 
that not only have “opened the door” to snooping by employers, but in fact 
have provided strong incentives for employers to snoop. 
1. How Hostile Environment Cases Encourage Employer Snooping 
One way in which the courts actively have encouraged employers to 
monitor employees relates to the courts’ jurisprudence in cases dealing 
with workplace sexual harassment.  As previously discussed, many 
employers harbor concerns about employees using the employers’ 
equipment in an inappropriate manner.  Employees may use their 
workplace email account or Internet access to post pornographic, obscene 
 
 180.  See Lazar, supra note 51, at 387 (stating that in applying the Quon Court’s analysis 
to the private sector, “courts looking at privacy policies will likely assess whether the policy 
is written and communicated clearly, with appropriate notice to employees”).  Notably, the 
Supreme Court is not the only entity guilty of injecting ambiguity into the scope of 
employee’s privacy rights and employers’ ability to monitor employees.  The NLRB 
recently has been grappling with a similar issue, focusing on whether and how employers 
can regulate their employees’ social media usage.  See Dubé, supra note 140 (describing the 
NLRB’s report regarding employees’ social media activities).  Among other guidance, the 
NLRB warned against overbroad social media policies and advised employers not to 
implement policies that might “chill” employees in their right to engage in concerted 
activities.  See id.  However, several commentators (generally practitioners representing 
employers) have criticized the NLRB’s position as unnecessarily ambiguous and 
inconsistent in its application of the NLRA to these social media policies.  See Parent, supra 
note 68, at *7 (arguing that “[t]here has been some inconsistency with respect to the 
NLRB’s decisions in this area”); see also Social Media Policies And The NLRB: What 
Employers Need To Know, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.fenwick.com/Publications/Pages/Social-Media-Policies-And-The-NLRB-What-
Employers-Need-To-Know.aspx (stating that “the NLRB’s memoranda and decisions 
provide the only real guidance regarding the intersection between social media and Section 
7 rights; unfortunately, this guidance is not intuitive for employers, at times seems 
inconsistent, and can be difficult to interpret”); Christopher P. Calsyn & Kris D. Meade, 
Uncertain Advice In NLRB’s Social Media Memorandum, LAW360 (June 26, 2012), 
http://www.crowell.com/files/Uncertain-Advice-In-NLRBs-social-Media-Memoranda.pdf 
(observing that “[a] close review of the [NLRB’s] May 30 report reveals continued 
inconsistent treatment of employer policies, both within this report and when compared to 
Solomon’s earlier reports”). 
2014] IN DEFENSE OF SNOOPING EMPLOYERS 587 
 
or other otherwise harassing images and messages.
181
  Employees likewise 
may use social media sites to send sexually explicit or otherwise 
inappropriate messages to coworkers.
182
  This type of conduct not only 
could create distractions in the workplace and undermine employee morale, 
but it also might create liability for the employer under Title VII’s
183
 
prohibition against workplace harassment by creating a “hostile working 
environment” for employees.
184
 
Under Title VII, employers have a legal obligation to take various 
steps to prevent and eliminate harassing behavior in the workplace.
185
  In 
many cases, employers must do more than simply wait for employees to 
come forward with complaints about harassing behavior before reacting to 
those complaints.  Rather, employers frequently possess an affirmative 
obligation to prevent and eliminate harassing behavior.  In its twin 
decisions of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
186
 and Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth,
187
 the Supreme Court held that an employer may have 
vicarious liability to an employee who is subjected to unlawful harassment 
by a supervisor with authority over that employee.
188
  According to the 
Court, however, if the supervisor’s conduct did not result in a tangible 
employment action for the employee in question (i.e., a termination, 
demotion, or other negative change in the terms and conditions of 
employment), the employer may be able to avoid some or all of its liability 
if the employer can show (i) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior; and (ii) that the 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or otherwise to avoid the 
harm.
189
  In other words, an employer taking this type of preventative 
action can assert an affirmative defense against sexual harassment liability. 
But, if an employer’s defense in these types of hostile environment 
cases will depend, inter alia, on its efforts to “prevent and promptly 
correct” any sexually harassing behavior, how should the employer go 
about availing itself of this defense?  What steps should the employer take 
 
 181.  See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
 182.  See id. 
 183.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2005), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a (2005) (“Title VII”). 
 184.  See Sprague, supra note 5, at 112-13 (citations omitted); see also Ciocchetti, supra 
note 13, at 285 (citation omitted). 
 185.  See generally Enforcement Guidance for Vicarious Employer Liability for 
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
June 18, 1999, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html. 
 186.  524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  See Sprague, supra note 5, at 112. 
 189.  Id. 
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to learn about this inappropriate behavior in the first place, and then to 
ensure that the behavior does not continue?  The most effective way for an 
employer to do so will be by monitoring employee behavior. 
Notably, in his dissent in Ellerth, Justice Thomas seemed to predict 
the extent to which this affirmative defense could incentivize employers to 
monitor their employees.  Thomas argued that “[s]exual harassment is 
simply not something that employers can wholly prevent without taking 
extraordinary measures – constant video and audio surveillance, for 
example – that would revolutionize the workplace in a manner 
incompatible with a free society.”
190
  Privacy scholar Jeffrey Rosen has 
expressed a similar concern, arguing that “[b]ecause it is difficult to know 
in advance what kind of sexually related behavior or speech a reasonable 
juror might find hostile or offensive, prudent employers have a strong 
incentive to monitor and punish far more private speech and conduct than 
the law actually forbids.”
191
  Indeed, according to Rosen, the courts have 
“creat[ed] a liability regime where monitoring of employees’ speech and 
behavior is a matter of corporate self-interest.”
192
 
If employers have an obligation to prevent harassing behavior in the 
workplace – and in fact, can avoid liability by showing that they took 
appropriate steps to do so – then one would expect them to use all readily 
available tools to fulfill this obligation.  In many instances, that may mean 
monitoring employees’ email, Internet usage, social media posts and other 
behaviors, to make sure that inappropriate language and/or conduct is not 
entering the workplace.  In this way, by providing employers with a 
tremendous legal advantage (and thus, indirectly, a financial benefit) linked 
to finding out about inappropriate workplace conduct, the Court actively 
encourages employers to monitor their employees. 
2. How the Court’s Third-Party Retaliation Jurisprudence 
Encourages Employer Snooping 
A more subtle example of the Supreme Court providing employers 
with an incentive to snoop arose in the January 2011 case Thompson v. 
North American Stainless, LP.
193
  In Thompson, the plaintiff, Eric 
 
 190.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 770, (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also 
Rosen, supra note 116, at 80 (“Most people are surprised to learn that sexual harassment law 
does not impose liability on sexual harassers.  Instead, it puts the full weight of 
responsibility on their employers”). 
 191.  Rosen, supra note 116, at 13. 
 192.  Id. at 79. 
 193.  Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2011) (rev’d S.Ct. 863 (2011)).  
This Section draws upon ideas previously explored in this author’s earlier work, Jessica 
Fink, Protected by Association?  The Supreme Court’s Incomplete Approach to Defining the 
Scope of the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 521 (2011) (examining 
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Thompson, worked for the defendant North American Stainless, LP 
(“North American”), as did his then-fiancée Miriam Regalado.
194
  
Thompson claimed that shortly after Regalado filed a discrimination charge 
against North American, North American terminated Thompson’s 
employment.
195
  According to Thompson, North American fired him solely 
in retaliation for Regalado’s protected activity.
196
 
Thompson’s claim implicated an area of jurisprudence under Title VII 
known as the “third-party retaliation doctrine.”  In a “typical” retaliation 
case, a plaintiff will claim (i) that he or she engaged in some “protected 
activity” for purposes of Title VII;
197
 (ii) that he or she suffered some 
adverse employment action; and (iii) that there is some causal connection 
between the protected activity and the adverse action.
198
  Thus, an 
employee might assert a retaliation claim if he was fired or denied a 
promotion because he had engaged in some “protected activity,” perhaps 
by filing a charge of discrimination or bringing a Title VII lawsuit against 
his or her employer.
199
 
Third-party retaliation claims are slightly different.  Third-party 
retaliation claims generally arise when an employee claims to have 
received adverse treatment from an employer not due to any conduct 
engaged in by that employee himself, but rather due to conduct engaged in 
by another employee.  “For example, Joe Senior gets fired because his son, 
Joe Junior, filed a discrimination charge against their mutual employer; 
 
Thompson and its potential impact on both employers and employees). 
 194.  See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 806 (holding that employee who was terminated after 
his fiancée filed gender discrimination charge was not a member of a protected class and 
Title VII does not create a cause of action for third-party retaliation for persons who have 
not personally engaged in protected activity). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id.  
 197.  There are two categories of “protected activity” recognized for purposes of a 
retaliation claim under Title VII.  First, the “participation clause” within Title VII’s 
retaliation provision prohibits employers from taking adverse action against employees who 
“ha[ve] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner” in the investigation 
or litigation of any discrimination complaint.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  Second, the 
“opposition clause” of the statute protects employees who have “opposed any practice made 
an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 198.  See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-58 (3rd Cir. 2002) (citation 
omitted) (reversing lower court dismissal because plaintiff presented a cognizable claim 
against his employer); Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 
2002) (citation omitted) (holding that employee established a prima facie case of retaliation 
under Title VII by showing a causal connection between involvement in a protected activity 
and adverse employment action).   
 199.  See e.g., Decker v. Andersen Consulting, 860 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(allowing retaliation claim to proceed where employee presented genuine issue of material 
fact that employer reduced her responsibilities and terminated her employment in response 
to her filing EEOC charge of discrimination and informing employer of intent to pursue 
discrimination claim). 
590 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
Wendy Wife is demoted because her spouse and coworker, Harry Husband, 
called the EEOC to report workplace discrimination.”
200
  These situations 
represent a twist on the traditional retaliation claim that Title VII allows. 
Thompson’s claim in suing North American was essentially this: 
Thompson did not claim that he personally engaged in any protected 
activity, such as by assisting Regalado in filing her discrimination charge 
or otherwise opposing North American’s alleged treatment of Regalado.
201
  
Rather, Thompson explicitly alleged in his complaint “that his ‘relationship 
to Miriam Thompson [nee Regalado] was the sole motivating factor in his 
termination.’”
202
  While many courts – including every federal court of 
appeals to consider the issue – previously had held that claims of “third-
party retaliation” fell outside of Title VII’s retaliation provision,
203
 the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Thompson ultimately decided that this claim could 
proceed, finding that Thompson could allege a third-party retaliation claim 
based upon Regalado’s protected activity.
204
 
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court inadvertently may 
have created a strong incentive for employers to snoop.  While the Court 
held that Title VII would permit third-party retaliation claims, it expressly 
declined to provide any specific guidance regarding what types of 
relationships that could support these types of claims.
205
  Instead, the Court 
merely stated that lower courts should examine the “particular 
circumstances” in any given case to determine whether to recognize a claim 
of third-party retaliation,
206
 emphasizing only that “the provision’s standard 
for judging harm must be objective,” as opposed to relying upon a 
plaintiff’s subjective feelings.
207
  In other words, the Court held that Title 
VII (sometimes) would permit third-party retaliation claims, without 
outlining any guidelines defining the scope of such claims.
208
 
Ironically, the Court adopted this rather broad view despite the fact 
 
 200.  See Fink, supra note 193, at 526-27 (discussing the assertion of third-party 
retaliation claims under Title VII). 
 201.  See Thompson, supra note 194, at 805-06 (observing that Thompson did not claim 
that he personally engaged in any protected activity). 
 202.  Id. at 806; see also id. at 808 (observing that Thompson’s “Statement of the Issue” 
on appeal and “Statement of Facts” also made clear that Thompson’s retaliation claim was 
based upon the protected activity  of his fiancée, as opposed to any activity that he engaged 
in himself). 
 203.  See Fink, supra note 193, at 527-28 (citations omitted) (discussing the approach 
taken by federal courts prior to Thompson in denying third-party retaliation claims). 
 204.  Thompson, supra note 193, at 867. 
 205.  See id. at 868. (“We must also decline to identify a fixed class of relationships for 
which third-party reprisals are unlawful.”). 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (parenthesis in original). 
 208.  See Fink, supra note 193, at nn.52-56 and accompanying text (citations omitted) 
(explaining the Court’s decision in Thompson). 
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that, during the oral argument of this case, several justices appeared to fret 
about the boundaries of the third-party retaliation doctrine.  For example, 
Justice Alito questioned Thompson’s counsel, asking “[s]uppose 
Thompson were not Regalado’s fiancée at the time.  Suppose they were . . . 
just good friends . . . .  The way the company wanted to get at her was by 
firing her friend.  Would that be enough?”
209
  Advocating for what he 
referred to as a “clear line” in this area, Justice Alito observed, “I can 
imagine a whole spectrum of cases in which there is a lesser relationship 
between these two persons, and . . . unless there’s a clear line there 
someplace, this theory is rather troubling.”
210
  Chief Justice Roberts 
expressed similar concerns, inquiring of the Deputy Solicitor General (who 
also was arguing in favor of Thompson), “[h]ow are we supposed to tell, or 
how is an employer supposed to tell, whether somebody is close enough or 
not?”
211
 
Among the many possible ramifications from the Court’s intentional 
lack of clarity in this case regarding the scope of the third-party retaliation 
doctrine,
212
 one notable concern is the extent to which this ambiguity has 
the potential to erode employee privacy.  By merely stating that employers 
might be liable for taking adverse action against an employee if the 
employee has a “sufficiently close relationship” with a coworker who has 
engaged in protected activity – and by not elaborating on what types of 
relationships will satisfy this criterion – the Court forces employers to 
potentially make important employment decisions based upon incomplete 
information.  A cautious employer might want to assume that a court will 
give this doctrine the broadest possible scope, encompassing even 
relatively casual relationships within the ambit of the doctrine.  Thus, in 
order to assess the risk of taking adverse action against an employee, such a 
risk-averse employer may want to know, prior to taking adverse action 
against an employee, all of the workplace relationships of that employee—
whether the employee is married to, dating, or perhaps mere lunchroom 
buddies with a coworker who previously engaged in some protected 
activity.  As Justice Alito observed during the oral arguments in Thompson 
(despite ultimately signing on to the Majority’s decision): 
Put yourself in the – in the shoes of an employer, and you . . . 
want to take an adverse employment action against employee A.  
You think you have good grounds for doing that, but you want – 
 
 209.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. 
Ct. 863 (2011) (No. 09-291) [hereinafter “Thompson Oral Argument Transcript”]. 
 210.  Id. at 12. 
 211.  Id. at 20. 
 212.  See generally Fink, supra note 193, at 561-66 (arguing that the Court should have 
provided a more detailed framework regarding the factors to be used in conducting analyses 
of third-party retaliation claims). 
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before you do it, you want to know whether you’re potentially 
opening yourself up to a retaliation claim.  Now, what is the 
employer supposed to do then?  They say . . . we need to survey 
everybody who is engaged in protected conduct, and now we 
need to see whether this person who we’re thinking of taking the 
adverse employment action against has a . . . ‘close relationship’ 
with any of those people.
213
 
In this way, the Court’s failure to set clear boundaries regarding the 
scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine gives employers a strong 
incentive to snoop.  Those employers who are able to ferret out their 
employees’ personal workplace relationships may minimize (or at least get 
an early handle on) the potential liability associated with some 
contemplated adverse action – a high-value result for many employers.  
While employees may find these inquiries into their private lives 
troublesome and intrusive, the Supreme Court has created a framework that 
actively encourages this type of behavior by employers. 
V. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON SNOOPING EMPLOYERS 
While employers frequently possess strong incentives to snoop and 
often do so for legitimate reasons, that does not mean that they should have 
unfettered access to all aspects of their employees’ private lives.  To the 
contrary, in permitting some monitoring by employers, the courts should 
establish clear limits on when and how employers can monitor lawfully. 
Perhaps the most significant limit that should be placed on monitoring 
by employers relates to employers’ motivations for snooping: Simply 
because employers can snoop does not always mean that they should.  
Rather, employers wishing to investigate prospective or current employees 
should have to provide a legitimate justification for doing so.  Indeed, 
courts could adopt the analytical framework used in disparate impact 
discrimination claims.  There, once an employee has shown that an 
employer has a policy or practice that has a disparate impact on members 
of a particular racial group (or other protected class), the employer has the 
burden of proving that the policy or practice in question is job related for 
the particular position at issue and consistent with business necessity.
214
  If 
the employer meets this burden, then the burden will shift to the plaintiff to 
show that there is a less discriminatory alternative that meets the business 
need and that the employer refuses to adopt that alternate approach.
215
 
Courts could adopt a similar approach to claims of unwarranted 
 
 213.  Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 209, at 17-18. 
 214.  EEOC Compliance Manual § 15-V.B at 21, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
Mar. 19, 2006, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html#VB. 
 215.  Id. at 21-22 (citation omitted). 
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employer snooping.  Once an employee demonstrated that a policy or 
practice by his or her employer intruded into an area in which the employee 
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court could require the 
employer to show that the intrusion was related to the position in question 
and that the monitoring was serving a real business need.  If the employer 
could satisfy this burden, then the plaintiff could only prevail by 
establishing a less intrusive manner for gathering the information in 
question and showing that the employer had declined to adopt this less 
restrictive approach. 
For example, a private high school might adopt a policy barring 
teachers and other staff from “friending” any current students on Facebook, 
and might require covered employees to allow the school administration to 
review periodically the complete list of their Facebook “friends.”  If a 
teacher or staff member claimed that this policy violated his or her 
reasonable expectations of privacy, the school could argue a legitimate 
business need to avoid any appearance of impropriety or favoritism by 
staff.  The objecting employee then would have to argue that the school 
could accomplish this goal through less intrusive means (such as by 
including in the contracts for applicable teachers and staff a provision in 
which they agreed not to “friend” any students). 
In addition to justifying the reason for an intrusion, employers should 
also be required to take steps to verify any information that they receive 
before acting on it, particularly when gathering information as part of the 
hiring process.  While technological advances and increased monitoring 
may greatly expand the amount of information available to employers, the 
quality of that information is often questionable at best.
216
  As discussed 
above, “traditional” information gathering tools such as honesty tests and 
other psychological exams are of dubious reliability.
217
  Moreover, 
background checks or general Internet searches may turn up information 
about the wrong individual, especially if the candidate or employee has a 
fairly common name.
218
  In one case, a woman interviewing for a job as a 
sales clerk was denied the position after a criminal record check turned up 
arrest records for criminal prostitution and drug possession – arrest records 
that actually belonged to a different individual with the same name.
219
  In 
another incident, a man on the brink of being hired for a truck driving job 
 
 216.  See, e.g., Wells, supra note 49 (describing the denial of employment to an 
applicant based on an erroneous shoplifting report). 
 217.  See Stabile, supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 218.  See Josh Brodesky, Background Checks Prone to Mistakes, Can Shut Out Jobs, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2012, 1:20 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/11/20/background-screening-gone-
wrong/1716439/ (highlighting the question of the accuracy of background checks especially 
in cases where a person has a common name).  
 219.  See Wells, supra note 49 (describing the case of Katrina Haines). 
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lost the position after a background check incorrectly labeled him a 
convicted pedophile.
220
  Even an individual’s own Facebook account may 
contain misleading or inaccurate information, given the ability of anyone to 
“tag” another individual in a posting or photograph, often without that 
individual’s knowledge or consent.
221
 
In the context of employee references, as discussed above, employers 
enjoy a qualified privilege to provide information to another employer, so 
long as the employer does not communicate false information about an 
employee “with malice.”
222
  However, perhaps the courts should impose 
more stringent obligations on the employer-recipients of this and other 
information, requiring employers to make reasonable efforts to confirm the 
accuracy of any information before using it as the basis for an adverse 
employment decision.  In so doing, the courts could strike a proper balance 
between allowing employers broad latitude to gather information about 
their employees and applicants, while providing some protection against 
employees suffering harm from false or misleading information. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over the proper scope of employee privacy in the 
workplace will continue to attract significant attention in years to come.  
According to a recent study by the U.S. Department of Labor Wage and 
Hour Division, laws addressing worker privacy were among the most 
common new pieces of labor and employment legislation enacted by states 
in 2012.
223
  As a competitive business climate renders employers 
 
 220.  See Olivera Perkins, Errors in Background Checks Cost Job Seekers, PLAIN 
DEALER (Dec. 15, 2012, 8:03 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012/12/job_applicants_lose_out_as_err_1.ht
ml. 
 221.  Paul Boutin, How to Block Facebook Photos of Yourself, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE 
(May 5, 2009, 7:40 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/how-to-block-
facebook-photos-of-yourself/ (“There is no way to prevent someone from tagging a photo 
with either your username, or your name as a tag.  What’s possible is you can prevent other 
users from searching for photos of you.”); see also Jenna Wortham, New Facebook Location 
Feature Sparks Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 18, 2010, 9:44 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/new-facebook-location-feature-sparks-privacy-
concerns/ (highlighting an application called Facebook Places that allows users to “tag” an 
accompanying friend and post his or her location to Facebook). 
 222.  See Befort, supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 223.  See John J. Fitzpatrick, Jr. & James L. Perrine, State labor legislation enacted in 
2012, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 24 (Feb. 2013) (tabling all enacted state labor legislation for 
2012); see also States Targeted Worker Privacy, Trafficking In Labor Legislation Last Year, 
DOL Reports, 47 DAILY LAB. REP. A-7 (Mar. 5, 2013) (“For the second consecutive year, 
the most legislative activity came in the worker privacy category, as 30 bills related to the 
subject were passed in 20 states during 2012.”).  Legislators passed 31 worker privacy-
related laws in 20 states in 2011.  Id. 
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increasingly more concerned about protecting their financial assets, 
proprietary information, reputation, and other resources—and as 
technological advancements make it progressively easier for employers to 
engage in novel methods of monitoring their employees—questions about 
the limits on employer snooping will continue to occupy a dominant place 
in our legal, social, and political conversations. 
This article is not intended as a defense of every action that an 
employer may take to gather information about a prospective or current 
employee.  Without a doubt, abuses of employee privacy can and do occur.  
The limited privacy rights applicable to private sector employees means 
that employers have significant latitude with respect to the actions that they 
legally can take in monitoring their workers.  However, there may be many 
situations where simply because an employer legally can engage in a 
particular type of monitoring, it might not be prudent or proper for the 
employer to do so. This article has not discussed the negative impact on 
morale that might result from extensive employer snooping—an impact 
that might be substantial in some cases.
224
  Nor has this article discussed 
whether there are certain areas of an employee’s private life that simply 
should remain off limits to snooping from a moral perspective.
225
 
The purpose of this article is to put the “problem” of employee 
snooping in a more realistic and nuanced context.  With the media in an 
uproar over alleged privacy invasions by employers, with legislators 
responding with predictable bluster, and with members of the public 
predictably confused about their rights, there is some benefit to putting this 
putative problem in perspective.  Concerns about employees’ rights must 
include consideration of the rights and responsibilities of employers as 
well—the right of an employer to protect itself from financial injuries or 
legal exposure; the responsibility to protect its shareholders from 
unnecessary loss; the responsibility to protect its employees from a host of 
 
 224.  See Jay P. Kean, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles 
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 320 (2002) 
(detailing the impact of monitoring on employees’ psychology and on overall morale, 
stating that monitoring “takes its toll on workers and companies in terms of stress, fatigue, 
apprehension, motivation, morale, and trust; this results in increased absenteeism, turnover, 
poorer management, and lower productivity, not to mention higher health-care costs. Thus, 
monitoring may spoil the workplace environment, and it can have a detrimental effect on 
productivity”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 225.  See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: 
Tortious and Ethical Aspects, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1263 (1993) (addressing the legal and moral 
issues developing in the field of employee privacy); see also Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, Ethical 
Implications of Employee Monitoring: What Leaders Should Consider, J. APPLIED MGMT. & 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, July 2003, at 22, available at 
http://www.huizenga.nova.edu/Jame/articles/employee-monitoring.cfm (examining the 
ethical implications of employee monitoring and recommending employers exercise 
restraint). 
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physical, mental, and other harms; and the responsibility to protect the 
public from what might result if employers were to make important hiring 
and other work-related decisions based upon dangerously incomplete 
information.  We cannot maintain a framework where a lack of information 
subjects employers to significant risks and potential liability, and then 
stymies employers’ reasonable efforts to gather that information in a 
reasonable manner. 
 
 
